



BASELINE ASSESSMENT FOR PROJECT LANTERN

February 24, 2007



PROJECT
LANTERN.




CJA

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the findings from a study conducted in October 2006 to examine sexual trafficking in minors in Cebu, Philippines. The study was conducted by Crime and Justice Analysts, Inc. (CJA), an independent research and evaluation firm specializing in criminology and criminal justice.

The International Justice Mission® (IJM) retained CJA to support its work in reducing the number of sex trafficking victims by conducting a formal, scientific study collecting quantitative data that will help measure the impact of a new initiative, Project Lantern. The project is designed to reduce the incidence of sex trafficking in the target area by strengthening local capacity to successfully locate, arrest, and prosecute perpetrators, thereby leading to increased expectations of criminal sanctions for violating trafficking laws.

The baseline study described here is the first of three waves of data collection designed to measure the availability of sex-trafficking victims in Cebu. Together, these three waves will be used by IJM and its contractors to evaluate the effectiveness of Project Lantern. IJM provided CJA with a list of eight indicators or proxies intended to measure the availability of child sex trafficking victims. CJA then deployed a team of 10 people (including eight investigators, one data collection expert, and one security expert) to the Philippines for training and data collection. The eight investigators each spent seven (and in some cases eight) nights visiting bars, brothels, massage parlors, malls, a red light district, and other locations where people seeking sex go to find prostituted or commercially exploited women and girls.

The eight investigators posed as sex tourists and sought out prostituted or commercially exploited minors. They engaged in training on age estimation and used a number of age-confirmation processes to determine whether someone was in fact a minor. While conducting their covert observations, the investigators systematically collected data on a number of variables having to do with the people they were meeting and the places they were visiting. As they gathered the necessary data, they submitted it regularly to a centralized command center using cellular telephones (either by voice or by text). The data were entered into a series of databases by a data coordinator at the command center. Those databases, as well as the qualitative field notes written by the investigators at the end of their shifts, constitute the primary data sources for the findings presented in this report.

During the course of the study, the investigators made 84 visits to bars, 12 visits to brothels, 19 visits to massage parlors, 16 visits (walk-throughs) to malls, and four visits to a busy red-light district. Out

of the 94 bars, brothels, and massage parlors visited by the investigators (some were visited multiple times), commercially exploited minors were located in 35. Altogether, the investigators observed approximately 1,550 prostituted or commercially exploited women and girls. Of these, 103 (6.6%) were confirmed as minors. Across all attempts to locate minors, it took our investigative teams, on average, 113 minutes to locate a minor. The report presents a more detailed look at the study's findings.

The results of the baseline study confirm the presence of prostituted or commercially exploited minors in Cebu. Although our investigators routinely encountered token resistance to their efforts to find minors, the fact that they were able to find them so quickly and so easily suggests that there are many to be found. The investigators were unable, despite their best efforts, to locate prostituted or commercially exploited preteens; most of the minors we discovered were 16 or 17 years old. Our findings also suggest that minors come to be employed in the sex trade through different routes, although all of them are considered "trafficking victims" under Philippine law. Some appear to seek the work out of economic necessity; several minors told us they forged their paperwork to get the job. Others fit the more conventional image of a sex trafficking victim in the sense that they were taken involuntarily from their homes, they are moved around to work in different cities depending on customer demand, and they show visible signs of maltreatment and poor living conditions.

Over the past decade, there has been an increase in the extent to which criminological interventions like Project Lantern have been subjected to independent, external evaluation to assess their effectiveness. The new emphasis on evaluation research is part of a larger movement in several disciplines toward "evidence-based" policymaking.¹ We applaud IJM and the Gates Foundation for their willingness to evaluate the effectiveness of Project Lantern. The result will be an increased understanding of sexual trafficking in minors and hopefully an enhanced capacity to implement effective solutions.

1 Petrosino, Anthony, Robert F. Boruch, Haluk Soydan, Lorna Duggan, and Julio Sanchez-Meca (2001). "Meeting the Challenges of Evidence-Based Policy: The Campbell Collaboration," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 578, No. 1, 14-34.

I. INTRODUCTION

The International Justice Mission® (IJM) retained Crime and Justice Analysts, Inc. (CJA) to support its work in reducing the number of sex trafficking victims by conducting a formal, scientific study collecting quantitative data that will help measure the impact of a new initiative, Project Lantern. The project is designed to reduce the incidence of sex trafficking in the target area by strengthening local capacity to successfully locate, arrest, and prosecute perpetrators, thereby leading to increased expectations of criminal sanctions for violating trafficking laws. According to IJM, this should, in turn, help deter future acts and lead to a decrease in the overall level of sex trafficking. IJM will also work with local stakeholders to ensure that rescued trafficking victims receive appropriate aftercare services.

The findings reported here represent the initial step in an evaluation process that IJM will execute over several years. According to IJM's evaluation methodology, this baseline study is the first of a series of three in-country studies designed to measure the availability of sex trafficking victims in Cebu, Philippines. This study was conducted prior to the implementation of any training activities or other interventions by IJM in Cebu in order to establish a baseline measure of the availability of trafficking victims. According to IJM, a second study will be conducted at the project midpoint, and a final study will be conducted at the end of the project in order to measure any changes in the availability over the life of the project and help assess whether those changes occurred as a result of Project Lantern. This report provides a brief introduction to the baseline study, describes the methodology used for collecting data and estimating the ages of sex trafficking victims, and presents the findings.

II. PROJECT INDICATORS

Given the hidden and illegal nature of sex trafficking, generating an accurate count of the total population of sex trafficking victims is difficult. Without having an accurate knowledge of the total size of the sex trafficking victim population, it is difficult to measure with confidence a reduction in the absolute number of people who have been trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation.²

Therefore, instead of coming up with measures based on enumerating the population or its various subparts, IJM chose a list of proxy indicators that measure the *availability* of child sex trafficking victims. The indicators for which CJA was responsible for collecting data are as follows:

1. Number of children trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation found in target area.
2. Elapsed time to locate a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation.
3. Number of attempts to locate a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation.
4. Number of establishments offering a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation.
5. Number of people not affiliated with a commercial sex establishment offering a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation.
6. Price charged for purchasing the services of a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation.
7. Percentage of total attempts to procure a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation that results in the presumed facilitator, victim, or prostituted or commercially exploited person citing the police/law enforcement as the reason why a minor is not available for sex.³
8. Incidence/type of security measures at establishments taken to guard against police enforcement.

IJM instructed CJA to use a definition of “sex trafficking” that is consistent with Philippine law. While the project will locate and effect the rescue of both adult and child trafficking victims, for the

2 A recent compendium of research on human trafficking concluded “perhaps the most challenging factor is that most of the populations relevant to the study of human trafficking...constitute so-called hidden populations. A hidden population is a group of individuals for whom the size and boundaries are unknown, and for whom no sampling frame exists.” See G. Tyldum and A. Brunovskis (2005). “Describing the Unobserved: Methodological Challenges in Empirical Studies on Human Trafficking,” p. 17 in *Data and Research on Human Trafficking: A Global Survey*, edited by F. Laczko and Elzbieta M. Godziak. New York: United Nations Publications.

3 The term “prostituted or commercially exploited women or men” is a term used in the Philippines to refer to commercial sex workers and is the one used by IJM’s Manila office.

purposes of this study, CJA was asked solely to locate minor trafficking victims. According to IJM's interpretation of Philippine law, minors—defined as persons under the age of 18—engaged in prostitution or commercial sexual exploitation are considered “trafficking victims” even if they do not meet conventional ideas about what constitutes trafficking, such as being forced against their will to engage in sex acts or being transferred involuntarily away from their home.⁴ Minor trafficking victims can be identified through visual identification and verification through conversations with the minor directly or with a third party to glean information that confirms the age of the child (a later section of this report will address the reliability and validity of methods used to determine whether someone is a minor). Confirming that an adult is a trafficking victim, however, is much more difficult as it requires the adult to self-identify as a trafficking victim. The amount of effort and resources required to elicit such information from prostituted or commercially exploited adults was beyond the scope of this study and, in addition, could have increased the level of danger faced by CJA staff that were going undercover to locate potential trafficking victims.

4 According to Section 3a of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 or Republic Act No. 9208, the term “trafficking in persons” refers to “the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs. The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered as “trafficking in persons” even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph. According to Section 3b of the same Act, the term “child” refers to: *“a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.”*

III. CONDUCTING THE STUDY

The contract between CJA and IJM specified two trips to Cebu during the baseline measurement period. A two-person advance team visited Manila and Cebu for an initial visit from August 30 to September 8 to arrange the logistics for the full ten-person team's subsequent visit and to conduct a preliminary investigation of the nature and scope of sex trafficking in the Cebu area. This initial inquiry included five nights of undercover work in bars and brothels in Cebu and Manila as well as a visit to IJM's Manila office. While in Cebu during the first visit, the advance team developed an initial familiarity with the various establishments and areas where commercial sexual exploitation thrives (KTV bars, go-go bars, casa brothels, Barangay Kamagayan, massage parlors, malls, and some outdoor areas where prostitutes are commonly found).⁵ They also began to arrange logistics for the full team's visit. This included purchasing cell phones for the team, testing various "scripts" to be used when trying to locate minors, and examining hotels (including both our "real" hotels to house team members, as well as the "operations" hotels used to launch certain operations and investigative activities. The data collected by the advance team during the first trip are considered preliminary and exploratory in nature and therefore are not reported here, as they were not necessarily collected using the same methods or with the same criteria established for the later field collection exercise.

In addition, during the initial visit, IJM's Manila office made arrangements for the advance team to visit Marillac Hills and the Haven for Women, two shelter facilities for abused or neglected women and children located just outside of Manila. At the facility, they conducted an initial exercise intended to hone their skills in estimating the age of young Filipina women and correctly determining whether they are minors. This exercise included 96 women and children who are residents of the shelter and served as a test run before setting up a similar exercise for the full project team on the second trip.

The second trip took place from October 7 to 17 and included the full ten-person team. Appendix 1 contains brief biographies of all project participants. This visit included a brief stop in Manila for field

5 We use the term "go-go bars" to refer to bars that feature strippers dancing out in the open, typically on a stage or a series of stages. "KTV bars" feature strippers dancing out in the open as well, but they have private rooms containing karaoke machines and couches. Customers can rent the rooms for a short time and sing karaoke with the scantily clad women or girls who work there. In some KTV bars, the customers are able to have sex with the girls in these private rooms; in others they are limited to private erotic dances and sexually suggestive seating arrangements (with girls sitting on the customer's lap or draping their legs over the customer's lap). "Casa brothels" are brothels located in houses, usually in residential neighborhoods. Casa brothels are nondescript and are not advertised; taxi drivers typically know where they are and steer customers there, presumably for a small kickback from the brothel owner. Barangay Kamagayan is a red-light district in Cebu city. We will provide a more complete description of Kamagayan shortly.

training on investigative methods and estimating the ages of Filipina women. On arrival in Manila, the CJA team visited go-go bars in Manila to begin adjusting to the setting and to working with each other as partners, as well as to practice scripts for getting acquainted with and determining the ages of Filipina women and girls. Members of the CJA team with some experience working in these kinds of settings provided feedback to other team members for whom this was a new experience. The next day, the CJA team, as well as three IJM investigators, participated in an age estimation exercise at Marillac Hills and the Haven for Women. Part V of this report provides a detailed description of that process as well as the findings.

After spending the first night in Manila, the CJA team then traveled to Cebu. Eight team members (whom we will refer to as our “investigators”) were divided into four teams of two and conducted covert observations of the commercial sex industry at different hours during the day and night. Two additional team members, a data specialist and a security specialist, staffed our command center. The command center received phone calls and text messages from the investigative teams, entered this information into databases, tracked the current locations and statuses of the teams at all times, and initiated security procedures in the event of security concerns. This team consisted of Professor Joe Kuhns, who served as our data manager, as well as Nick Giangrosso, a security expert and former Baltimore homicide and vice detective.

Three of the investigative teams were each assigned a geographic area (Lapu Lapu, Mandaue City, and Cebu City). The fourth team, which was equipped with a hidden video camera, served as a roving team. The roving team had a number of roles: it revisited establishments in which the information collected by the primary team was ambiguous or inconsistent; it remained nearby a primary team if there was any indication of a security risk; it took video recordings in cases where the primary team thought there was a need for an outside opinion on the ages of women or girls working in the area; and it supplemented those primary teams working in areas too large to cover by themselves. The investigative teams carried out systematic observations within the areas where commercial sexual exploitation is carried out with greatest frequency, including brothels, bars, hotels, streets, and other locations. Within each of the three primary study zones, the investigative teams relied on intermediaries such as taxicab drivers, hotel staff, and other locals knowledgeable about the sex trade to refer us to locations where minor sex trafficking victims are most likely to be found.

IV. STUDY METHODOLOGY

This section outlines the methodology used during the baseline methodology study. It examines sampling, measurement, data collection, and data recording.

The basic means by which IJM will be measuring project impact is a simple three-wave panel design that will measure certain indicators of sex trafficking in the target area prior to any interventions implemented by IJM, during the intervention period, and then after interventions have been implemented in order to assess whether or not the interventions caused any changes in sex trafficking. Other kinds of data will also be collected on an ongoing basis to account for alternative explanations and to help isolate the causal link between project activities and changes in sex trafficking that may occur in Cebu.⁶

CJA and IJM explored the possibility of evaluating the impact of Project Lantern using an experimental design with measures being taken in experimental and control areas. The experimental areas would comprise Cebu City, Mandaue City, and Lapu-Lapu while the control area would be another community with a sex trafficking problem that would not receive any assistance from Project Lantern. Although adding a control site would have made good scientific sense, CJA and IJM decided not to use this approach for three reasons. First, IJM staff raised serious ethical concerns about locating minor sex trafficking victims and then not rescuing them. Second, CJA anticipated some logistical difficulties in locating and screening the additional staff necessary to carry out baseline measurements in the control site on such short notice. Third, at the time, funding had only been set aside for two waves of measurement, a baseline measurement prior to the implementation of Project Lantern, and a final measurement after the implementation was completed (approximately four years later). As we considered options for improving the strength of the evaluation design, we were faced with the choice of either adding a control site to the original two-wave study or adding an additional wave of measurement between the baseline and final measurements. CJA was concerned about the lengthy gap between these two measurement occasions and viewed the overall cost of adding a control site as less defensible than adding another measurement occasion and tracking additional indicators on an ongoing basis throughout the study period. Experimental designs maximize what statisticians call “internal validity,” which makes them an attractive option

⁶ At the baseline methodology workshop, project participants held a lengthy discussion about the kinds of data that IJM ought to collect on a regular basis to strengthen the evaluation. The group decided on several important variables and IJM is actively collecting those data.

for evaluating social interventions like Project Lantern. However, they are often difficult to put in place for ethical and logistical reasons.⁷

Sampling

CJA and IJM agreed early on that the evaluation would use a “repeated measures” or panel design that examines the same phenomenon at three separate points in time. One of the most important decisions in any repeated measures study is the selection of an appropriate sampling strategy that can be replicated at each wave. There are a number of potential alternatives.

The most direct approach would be to select a simple random sample of establishments and visit those same establishments in each wave. We decided against this approach because it has two primary problems. First, we do not have access to an accurate and complete “sampling frame” or list of establishments for drawing the sample. Some lists do exist, but they are incomplete. If the missing establishments are somehow different than the establishments included on these lists, which is likely, then drawing a sample based on these lists would result in a biased sample.⁸ Second, some prostituted or commercially exploited persons (such as freelancers and escorts) do not work for conventional “establishments” like KTV (karaoke) bars, go-go bars, brothels, or massage parlors. These limitations suggest that a proper sampling strategy needs to account for people who work in conventional establishments as well as those who are freelancers or who operate in some other less conventional way. Furthermore, a proper sampling strategy needs to enable the researchers to reach establishments that are not on current lists.

One of the standard approaches when doing a study without an adequate sampling frame is to use a multistage cluster design. Using this approach, we would begin at stage one by selecting a random sample of geographic areas such as neighborhoods (these constitute the “clusters”). Then at stage two, we would either select every establishment within the selected neighborhoods or a simple random sample of establishments in those neighborhoods. This strategy has the additional benefit of enabling

7 Lum, Cynthia, and Sue-Ming Yang (2005). “Why Do Evaluation Researchers in Crime and Justice Choose Non-Experimental Methods?” *Journal of Experimental Criminology* 1(2): 191-213; Sherman, Lawrence W. (2003). “Experimental Evidence and Governmental Administration.” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 589, No. 1, 226-233; Weisburd, David, Cynthia Lum and Sue-Ming Yang (2003). “When Can We Conclude that Treatments or Programs ‘Don’t Work?’” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 587:31-48.

8 Moreover, the bias is somewhat predictable. The missing establishments are likely to be those that are newer, smaller, less organized, and/or less well known. It is important that we try to capture the full range of establishments that might be offering minor sex trafficking victims, not just those that are well known.

us to come into contact with prostituted or commercially exploited persons working independently in those neighborhoods since it is focused on *areas* and not establishments per se. It would also enable us to reach those working in malls as long as the neighborhoods containing the malls were randomly selected at stage one of the sampling process. CJA has grid maps of the study area that divide it into 96 equally sized squares. These maps would be an ideal source for the geographic sampling at stage one.

Although the multistage cluster sampling approach has some benefits, we decided against it for three reasons. First, it is inefficient. We could have ended up randomly selecting a number of residential, industrial, or agricultural areas where we were unlikely to find prostituted or commercially exploited persons. Second, taxi drivers or other intermediaries⁹ would likely find it suspicious that we are seeking to locate establishments in such a rigid way, focusing so intently on selected squares on a grid overlaying the local map; sex tourists do not operate that way. We were concerned that word would get out about us, possibly raising security risks for our investigators. Third, we did not want our researchers wandering aimlessly around neighborhoods in search of establishments or freelancers in those cases where intermediaries aren't familiar with the selected areas. It is much more efficient and direct to allow intermediaries to steer us directly toward known establishments and areas with which they are familiar.

After dismissing these two standard sampling approaches, we decided to adopt a hybrid approach that enabled us to sample different populations of prostituted or commercially exploited persons using different strategies.

1. Sampling Bars and Brothels

The investigative teams sampled establishments by approaching secondary intermediaries like bellhops or taxi drivers.¹⁰ Our investigators learned very quickly that taxi drivers are the primary means by which sex tourists gain access to prostituted or commercially exploited persons in Cebu. In dozens

9 Because prostitution is nominally illegal in the Philippines, sex tourists often rely on *intermediaries*: third parties who are able to help them gain access to prostituted or commercially exploited persons. In this study, we classified intermediaries into two types. Primary intermediaries are those who work directly in the sex trade such as pimps, brothel owners, or Mamasans. Secondary intermediaries are those who work outside the sex trade, but have sufficient knowledge to be able to direct potential customers to locations where the sex trade is plied.

10 Secondary intermediaries are those whose involvement in the sex trade is not their primary form of employment. In the majority of cases, the secondary intermediary was a cab driver. Others included a hotel bellhop, a barber, and a street hustler (who was not a pimp but who was familiar with establishments providing sex for money. In some instances, primary intermediaries with more direct involvement in the sex trade (like pimps, brothel owners, or Mamasans) helped steer our investigators to establishments, but this was rare.

of cab rides, our investigators did not meet a single taxi driver who was unwilling or unable to direct them to a location where they could gain access to sex in exchange for money. It became clear very quickly that taxi drivers received some sort of inducement from certain bars or brothels (typically high-end ones) to direct sex tourists there. In each of the three zones where we carried out our data collection, once we had already visited these “hot spot” locations, it became increasingly difficult to find new locations. Some cab drivers claimed that they did not know about other spots, while other drivers seemed quite content to allow us to hire them for the evening to escort us to establishments of varying type, size, and “quality.” Our investigators continued hiring new intermediaries each evening, quickly letting go those who were unable to assist them in finding new locations.

Investigators informed the intermediaries that they were looking for “younger girls” or some other similarly descriptive yet vague language.¹¹ Once the intermediary identified an establishment within the team’s zone (Lapu Lapu, Mandaue City, or Cebu City), the team then visited that establishment. If the team had already visited the establishment, they encouraged the intermediary to recommend a different establishment. Once the team visited the establishment recommended by the intermediary, they took one of two courses of action. If there were other bars or brothels in the immediate area (within a five-minute walk), the team simply went to those locations next. Several areas contained concentrations of bars with prostituted or commercially exploited persons, and this method allowed for the possibility of visiting every establishment within a concentrated area. If there were not other bars or brothels in the area, the team would approach an intermediary (either the same one or a different one) and begin the process again.¹²

We anticipated that we would visit all bars and brothels in Lapu Lapu and Mandaue City using this method because the total number of establishments there was suspected to be small. In Cebu City (excluding Kamagayan),¹³ we anticipated that we would only be able to visit a sample of the establishments since we would not have enough personnel or be in the field long enough to visit them all.

11 CJA investigators were counseled by IJM attorneys in the Philippines not to say they were looking for “minors” because soliciting minors for sex is a criminal offense.

12 In some cases, teams would hire a taxi driver for the night, so that when they left an establishment, the cab driver was waiting outside ready to recommend another establishment and transport them there. The teams made the decision about whether to hire a taxi driver for a whole night on a case-by-case basis. In some cases, for instance, safety considerations led the team to want a cab waiting outside in case of a security concern. In other cases, such as when visiting brothels, it made sense to hire different cab drivers for visits to different brothels so the drivers would not become suspicious about why our investigators were repeatedly choosing not to hire a girl.

13 Kamagayan is a village (a small neighborhood) in Cebu City, but it is sufficiently distinctive that we will treat it as a separate community for purposes of sampling.

Our plan was to continue the process of asking intermediaries to recommend new locations until we ran out of time. We anticipated, based on impressions formed during our first trip, that this approach would produce a sample of approximately 100 bars and brothels. In the end, we made 84 visits to 66 bars and 12 visits to 11 brothels. Our impression is that we exhausted all or most establishments in Lapu Lapu and Mandaue City since we reached a saturation point in both locations where repeated attempts to discover establishments we had not previously visited were unsuccessful. We suspect that we did not visit all establishments in Cebu City, though by the final day of the study we were having difficulty finding establishments we had not previously visited. One additional day would probably have exhausted the Cebu City establishments (not including those in Kamagayan, which we will discuss shortly). In the end, we visited 26 bars and 4 brothels in Lapu Lapu, 9 bars and 2 brothels in Mandaue City, and 31 bars and 5 brothels in Cebu City. For purposes of the overall evaluation, CJA is continuing its efforts to assemble a list of bars and brothels in each location, including establishments we did not discover during the baseline measurement period.

2. Sampling Massage Parlors

In seeking out massage parlors where patrons can receive sexual services from a masseuse who is a minor, we followed a process very similar to the one we used for bars and brothels. Each team was required to approach an intermediary about finding a good location for a massage from a young girl who also provides sexual services. We anticipated visiting approximately 12 massage parlors, though this estimate included the possibility of multiple visits to the same place. In the end, we made 19 visits to 17 massage parlors, including 8 in Lapu Lapu, 1 in Mandaue City, and 8 in Cebu City.

3. Sampling Kamagayan

Barangay Kamagayan is a poor, distressed village within Cebu City. It is “the oldest red-light district in the Philippines,” with records revealing it “as a prostitution district since 1920.”¹⁴ Kamagayan is a three-block area with just under 1,900 residents living in 413 homes.¹⁵ Within that small area are approximately 35–42 brothels, according to some sources.¹⁶

Four main streets serve as the boundaries of Barangay Kamagayan: Junquera, P. del Rosario, Jakosalem, and Sanciango. Customers or “johns” typically come to Kamagayan in taxicabs that park on one

14 Pasricha, Josephine Acosta (2004). “First Christian city, oldest red-light district.” *Manila Standard*.
http://www.manilastandardtoday.com/?page=news05_may03_2004

15 Population and housing data are from the 2000 Philippine census.
<http://www.census.gov.ph/census2000/p072200.html>

16 This estimate is drawn from Pasricha (2004). We were unable to confirm it independently because we could not spend a sufficient amount of time in Kamagayan without blowing our cover.

of those four streets. The johns remain seated in the cab, and a pimp comes to the window to speak with them. The pimp will line up a group of girls or women from which the john can select. After the john makes his selection, the girl usually gets in the cab to go back to the hotel with the john. In some cases, the john can rent a small room on site, but the quality and cleanliness of the rooms are not reputed to be sufficient for most western customers.

Our two-person teams originally set out to make approximately twelve visits to Kamagayan during the data collection period. We ended up making three kinds of approaches to Kamagayan.¹⁷ First, we made two visits in which our investigators approached in a cab and pimps lined up girls for them to choose from. Taxi drivers were obviously nervous about taking us to Kamagayan because they viewed the area as dangerous. One drove our investigators to the area and then refused to stop (we did not count this as a visit). Second, we made four visits in which our investigators approached on foot. In one of those, we went inside a brothel to choose women, and in the other three, pimps assembled the women outside for us to choose from. Third, we visited approximately six bars in the area that employed sex workers. Our estimate of the number of bars we visited in Kamagayan is approximate because it was unclear in some cases which bars were located in Kamagayan proper and which were located on its outskirts. We eventually had to cut short our visits to Kamagayan because all three of the investigative teams that visited the area reported that they were “burned.”¹⁸

17 Because Kamagayan is so small, we purposely staggered our investigative teams, sending them in at different times and using different modes of entry. Furthermore, we sent in teams with mixed races that included combinations of several whites, two Filipinos (one from CJA and one IJM investigator who provided security for CJA), and one Chinese.

18 For instance, during our final visit to Kamagayan, two IJM investigators (providing security), three CJA investigators, and one pimp from another neighborhood all went to Kamagayan together in three separate cabs. While the pimps were lining up women and girls for our investigators to choose from, we saw one of the girls whispering to another person and pointing at us (one of our investigators had hired her out of a brothel in Kamagayan the night before, taken her to a bar, bought food and drinks for her, and then used the excuse that he was sick so she would not grow suspicious about him not completing a sexual transaction with her). In another instance, one of our investigators had hired a girl and then cut the date short using the excuse that he was sick. When she saw him again later, she approached him angrily and called him a liar in front of a pimp. In a third instance, two separate investigative teams realized that they had both purchased the services of girls from the same pimp; this led them to fear that the pimp would become suspicious. Overall, we grew concerned that word would get around about western men hiring girls from Kamagayan and then not completing a sexual transaction with them. Furthermore, during the incident in which we visited in three cabs, we selected the five youngest looking girls and hired them. Our plan was to take them to a restaurant and interview them. After we paid their pimps, several of the pimps started arguing loudly with one another about money. One even reached into our cab angrily as we were driving away. Everybody involved, including the IJM investigators who provided security and CJA’s security advisor, viewed it as unwise to revisit Kamagayan anytime soon.

4. Sampling Escorts

Our original sampling plan called for the command center to obtain phone numbers for escort services advertised in tabloid newspapers and other sources. The plan was that they would make as many calls as possible during the time they had available. We were forced to change that plan midstream because the command center was too busy with its other duties to carry out this side project. Instead, we split up one of the investigative teams, assigning one of the investigators (a Filipino) to carry out visits with another team to locations where having a native Filipino would be advantageous and assigning the other investigator to contact escort services seeking minor sex trafficking victims. Our investigator looked through local newspapers and magazines and searched the Internet to find advertisements for escort and outcall massage services (with the idea that these might be fronts for prostitution). He then rented a room in an inexpensive hotel and called the escort services from that room. In some cases, he arranged to meet an escort in person to check the credibility of their claims regarding age. Our original sampling plan called for 30 contacts; we ended up making some form of contact with 32, including conversations with staff at 30 locations and leaving unreturned messages at 2 locations.¹⁹

5. Sampling Freelancers

We were informed by local experts in sex trafficking and prostitution that Cebu is also home to a number of prostituted persons who do not work in an establishment like a bar, a brothel, or a massage parlor. Our research suggests that freelancers work primarily in the malls and on the streets. To examine the extent to which freelancers are available in the malls, we assigned each investigative team to walk through shopping malls separately to pose as sex tourists. We waited for prostituted women or their representatives to make some form of contact with us. Our preparatory research suggested that the prime time is from 4 p.m. to 8 p.m. Our investigators made 16 attempts in malls by walking from one end to the other for at least one hour attempting to make eye contact with people thought to be prostituted; these included:

- 6 visits to Ayala Mall in Cebu City
- 2 visits to Robinson Mall in Cebu City
- 2 visits to SM Mall in Cebu City
- 1 visit to Raintree Mall in Cebu City
- 1 visit to Country Mall in Cebu City
- 3 visits to Gaisano Mall in Lapu Lapu
- 1 visit to Marina Mall in Lapu Lapu

19 We called 36 escort services. For four of them, the number was wrong or there was no answer. Thirty of them returned our investigator's call and spoke with him. For two of them, the number appeared correct and our investigator left a message but did not receive a return call.

In designing our sampling strategy at the outset of this study, we found it difficult to establish a formal strategy for sampling freelancers who work the streets. Instead, we relied on a convenience sample of prostituted women whom we encountered during our time in the Cebu area. During our first trip to Cebu, our two-person advance team just happened to meet six of them walking together, including one confirmed minor and one suspected minor. All investigators were instructed to pay attention to the possibility that freelancers may be found in some outside locations and to engage them whenever possible. In the end, we met 25 sex workers in malls and 32 in outdoor locations.

Units of Analysis

In the jargon of social scientists, this study has three primary “units of analysis”: global attempts, sub-attempts, and establishments. We will begin by explaining the two different kinds of attempts.

Attempts

When our investigators set out to locate a minor, they were initiating what we called an attempt. We divided attempts into two nested types: “global attempts” and “sub-attempts.” A global attempt always contained one or more associated sub-attempts. At the start of the study, each investigator initiated his first global attempt. If he visited two bars without finding a minor and then located a minor at a third bar, then the global attempt consisted of three sub-attempts, two unsuccessful and one successful. Once a minor was located, resuming the search for additional minors meant the start of a new global attempt. Global attempts ended in only two ways: the investigator (or the team) located a minor, or the command center issued a request to cease the global attempt for administrative reasons (either because the zone was complete or because the study was over). Sub-attempts ended when the investigator reached some resolution about the presence of minors, either locating one, generating a promise for one, or failing to locate one and therefore needing to visit a new location or establishment. Let us provide a hypothetical example of global attempts and sub-attempts.

Suppose at the beginning of the study that Team 1 left their operations hotel at 2100 to visit a brothel for the first time. They would call in their departure time to the command center, signaling the launch of a new global attempt. Their visit to the brothel would also signal the beginning of a new sub-attempt. Suppose they went to the brothel and discovered that there were a number of prostituted or commercially exploited persons available but none of them were minors. Upon their exit, they would notify the command center of their departure time as well as other information about the brothel. Their failure to locate a minor would mean the end of the first sub-attempt, but their global attempt would continue. Upon their arrival at another establishment recommended by their cab driver (say a KTV bar), they would call in their arrival time and other descriptive information to the command center. This would launch sub-attempt 2 within global attempt 1. Suppose they locate

a minor at the KTV bar. Once they achieved some form of age confirmation (the minor admitted her age, for instance, and a friend confirmed it), they would exit the establishment, call in their findings to the command center, and that would signal the end of global attempt 1 as well the second sub-attempt within that global attempt. Once the investigators visited the next establishment, they would be opening up the first sub-attempt within a second global attempt. Dividing attempts into global attempts and sub-attempts is what allowed us to track the various kinds of indicators or proxies selected at the methodology workshop and record those measurements systematically in databases that could be analyzed systematically.

During each sub-attempt and each global attempt, we recorded the elapsed time from the start of our search for a minor until we were able to meet one (or more) in person or until we were promised one within a certain time period that depended on the nature of the transaction and the person making the promise.²⁰ Using the sub-attempt and global attempt approach, we recorded the characteristics of both unsuccessful attempts and successful attempts. These characteristics included the date and time of the attempt, the facilitator with whom the attempt was made, the steps taken by the facilitator to locate a minor, the excuses offered by the facilitator about why a minor was not available (if applicable), the duration of the attempt, and the price for having sex if the attempt was successful.

Establishments

The third unit of analysis in this study was the establishment. We systematically recorded the characteristics of each establishment we visited. What type of establishment was it? What was the nature of its security arrangements? How many minors were we able to locate there and at what cost?

Summary

The three databases we have described—one for global attempts, one for sub-attempts, and one for establishments—serve as the primary data source for this report. These databases will also serve as

20 Several time thresholds were discussed in various meetings and correspondence between IJM and CJA. We initially attempted to set a firm threshold for entertaining promises for minors. We wanted to select an appropriate time threshold that balanced two competing considerations. On one hand, we were concerned that if we allowed a primary intermediary too much time to come up with a minor (say twenty-four hours), he might abduct one just for us. On the other hand, we were concerned that if we allowed them too little time, we might end up systematically undercounting minor sex trafficking victims. Once in the field, we abandoned the need for a single threshold that applied equally to all situations. In most instances, it was clear that people making promises were not going to abduct a minor. Typically, promises for minors came about because the minors had already been “bar fined” or hired by another customer (and so we were instructed to come earlier next time) or because the minor was either not working that evening or was working at another bar or brothel. Note that a bar fine is the price for removing a prostituted girl from a bar.

IJM's point of comparison for subsequent waves of data collection within the larger evaluation of Project Lantern. In addition, this report relies heavily on the written field notes recorded by each team after their observations in the field.

Data Collection

Data collection took place within three zones in the greater Cebu metropolitan area: Lapu Lapu, Mandaue City, and Cebu City. All investigators carried cell phones displaying the current time, therefore enabling them to track the timing of various events. The cell phones all had text messaging capability. The investigators adopted various methods for retaining and recording the information they collected in the field. Some recorded their information on voice recorders attached to their cell phones; some took written notes surreptitiously in bathroom stalls or in the back seats of taxicabs; some did regular “data dumps” to the command center via text message; some sent text messages to themselves as a way of recalling the information they observed; and some called in their data to the command center over the telephone. The wide variation in the environments in which our investigators made their observations made it difficult to adopt a single standard: we allowed our investigators the freedom to record and transmit the necessary information to the command center in ways that made sense for them and their environment. For instance, while it was easy for our investigators to step outside a KTV bar and call in their data to the command center over the telephone, this same approach would have appeared suspicious to the brothel keepers in some of the brothels we visited in isolated areas. Once the data were transmitted to the command center (in whatever format), the data were entered into databases maintained by our data manager on a laptop computer.

All investigators were also instructed to prepare written field notes at the conclusion of their observations. The investigators found it challenging to complete the field notes for two reasons: fatigue and difficulty remembering the details of what they observed in the field. The fatigue was unexpected, though in hindsight it probably should not have been. Given the combination of several factors like jet lag, the nature of their work, the hours they kept (most observations took place from approximately 8 p.m. to 4 a.m.), and needing to sleep during the daylight, all of the investigators reported having difficulty sleeping. Our best guess is that they slept for an average of about four hours per night. Thus, a common pattern was for investigative teams to return home, debrief with one another about their observations until the wee hours of the morning, work on their field notes together, and then go to sleep before completing them. They would then wake up later and try to complete them, but as any good ethnographer knows, field notes need to be completed right away to maximize recall.²¹

21 CJA considered purchasing voice recorders for all the investigators but decided against it. That decision turns out to have been a mistake. Future studies like this one should rely on digital voice recorders for retaining information until the written field notes can be recorded.

In spite of these difficulties, every investigator completed written field notes, and these constitute an important resource for understanding what they observed in the field.

Our data were collected primarily from passive observations of phenomena in the field as well as conversations with a variety of people associated with commercial sexual exploitation. Our investigators used a series of scripts during their conversations with intermediaries and sex workers. Some of these were “canned” scripts that we had established beforehand; other scripts were improvised in the field to fit the dynamic circumstances we encountered. Initially, CJA had considered using only canned scripts as a means of ensuring reliability across waves of data collection, but as any good cop knows, the ability to improvise based on the circumstances is crucial for gathering information. Our investigators relied primarily on three kinds of scripts: entrance scripts, midstream scripts, and exit scripts. Entrance scripts were used to communicate our wishes to secondary intermediaries and to locate establishments where minor sex trafficking victims could be found. Midstream scripts were our “cover stories” used to secure the trust and confidence of prostituted persons and intermediaries. Exit scripts were used as our excuses for leaving an establishment, not hiring a prostituted person, or not completing a sexual transaction. Within each category, we allowed our investigators considerable leeway to choose canned scripts or invent others that they viewed as most appropriate for a given situation.

V. AGE ESTIMATION

The reliability and validity of our measurement strategy rests largely on our procedures for determining who was a minor and who was an adult. In this section, we discuss the scientific foundations of age estimation, the findings of the age estimation training exercise we conducted, and a brief description of the age estimation procedures used in this study.

Scientific Foundations of Age Estimation

One of the major methods used for estimating chronological age in child pornography cases is Tanner staging, named after the stages of physical development in children and adolescents outlined by James M. Tanner.²² Tanner's five stages (for girls) are based primarily on the nature of breast and pubic hair growth. While the Tanner stages have been used commonly by law enforcement personnel, prosecutors, and expert witnesses for estimating ages, Tanner and his colleagues have warned that estimating "probable chronological age... is a wholly illegitimate use of Tanner staging."²³ Furthermore, there are indications that the developmental stages outlined by Tanner are unequal for different racial and ethnic groups. For instance, one study of American girls aged 12 to 17 found "significant racial and geographic differences in the age of development of secondary sexual characteristics."²⁴ Asians are largely unstudied, but there are indications that their physical features do not develop on the same timeline as those of other populations.²⁵ Finally, the Tanner stages are useful for distinguishing between different stages of childhood and adolescence, but they are not useful for distinguishing between minors and adults, since the fifth and final stage starts at approximately 12 or 13 years old. Thus, while we initially considered using Tanner staging as a method for estimating age, we chose not to use it because the evidence against its use was clear and convincing.

Another set of methods for determining chronological age is based on a dental or skeletal examination. For instance, Demirjian and his colleagues have proposed a system for estimating "dental age"

22 Tanner, James M. (1962). *Growth at Adolescence* (2nd edition). Oxford: Blackwell Scientific.

23 Rosenbloom, Arlan L. and J. Tanner (1998). "Misuse of Tanner Puberty Stages to Estimate Chronological Age" (letter to the editor). *Pediatrics*, 102(6): 1494.

24 Harlan, William R., E.A. Harlan, and G.P. Grillo (1980). "Secondary Sex Characteristics of Girls 12 to 17 Years of Age: The U.S. Health Examination Survey." *Journal of Pediatrics*, 96(6): 1074-1078.

25 Personal correspondence, Arlan L. Rosenbloom, MD to Detective James F. McLaughlin, Keene (NH) Police Department (October 4, 1999). <http://www.ci.keene.nh.us/police/tannerscale.htm>

based on stages of tooth formation as determined using a panoramic radiograph (a dental x-ray).²⁶ Unfortunately, research on this and other methods for age estimation based on dental characteristics has cast doubt on their reliability and validity, especially when used on teenagers.²⁷ Physicians also use radiographs of the left hand to estimate “skeletal age” or “bone age.”²⁸ The results from using this method are highly correlated with actual chronological age, but their reliability and validity vary by race, ethnicity, and gender.²⁹ Even if these methods were reliable and valid, they are impractical to use in the field during a covert data collection exercise or investigation.

Another possibility for estimating the chronological age of living persons outside of a clinical setting is the use of biometric technologies. On June 8–9, 2000, the Commission on Online Child Protection, established by the Child Online Protection Act of 1998,³⁰ held hearings that considered (among other matters) the state of the art in biometric age verification technologies. According to expert testimony by John Woodward, a senior policy analyst at the Rand Corporation, “there are no age verification biometrics, no age determination biometrics, and no age estimation biometrics.”³¹ Similarly, Jeffrey Dunn and Fernando Podio, co-chairs of the Biometric Consortium, testified “there are no means to determine the age of an individual based on a physical or behavioral characteristic. Given the wide variability of human characteristics, it seems unlikely that any such technologies will be available in the future.”³² While research continues on biometric technologies that can be used to estimate ages, we are not aware of any that can outperform simple human judgment. Even if such technologies were available, it is improbable to use them in an undercover setting where the investigator is attempting to appear like just another customer or sex tourist.

26 Demirjian, A., H. Goldstein, and J.M. Tanner (1973). A new system of dental age assessment. *Human Biology: An International Record of Research*, 45(2): 211-27.

27 Hägg, Urban and Lars Matsson (1985). “Dental maturity as an indicator of chronological age: the accuracy and precision of three methods.” *The European Journal of Orthodontics*, 7(1):25-34.

28 Greulich W.W. and S.I. Pyle (1959). *Radiographic Atlas of Skeletal Development of the Hand and Wrist*, 2nd edition. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

29 Loder, R. T., D. T. Estle, K. Morrison, D. Eggleston, D. N. Fish, M. L. Greenfield, and K. E. Guire (1993). “Applicability of the Greulich and Pyle skeletal age standards to black and white children of today.” *Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine*, 147(12); Mora, S., M. I. Boechat, E. Pietka, H. K. Huang, and V. Gilsanz (2001). “Skeletal age determinations in children of European and African descent: Applicability of the Greulich and Pyle standards.” *Pediatric Research*, 50(5): 624-628; Ontell, F. K., M. Ivanovic, D. S. Ablin, and T. W. Barlow (1996). “Bone age in children of diverse ethnicity.” *American Journal of Roentgenology*, 167: 1395-1398.

30 47 U.S.C. § 231.

31 <http://www.copacommission.org/meetings/hearing1/woodward.test.pdf>

32 <http://www.copacommission.org/meetings/hearing1/dunn-podio.test.pdf>

The reason we have reviewed these various scientific methods and technologies for estimating ages is to demonstrate that there are no “industry standards” for estimating the chronological age of unknown individuals. The methods that are available have mostly been tested on Caucasian and African American populations and have unknown reliability and validity properties for Asians. In addition, they are impractical for use in an investigative setting. Because we were unable to rely on well-established field methods or technologies to help us estimate ages, it was necessary to establish our own methods.

Age Estimation Exercise

On October 9, 2006, CJA conducted an age estimation exercise at Marillac Hills and the Haven, a home for abused or abandoned girls and women. Ten members of the CJA team and three IJM investigators participated in the exercise as “coders,” guessing the ages of girls and women whose ages are known. Because two members of the CJA team were employed solely in the command center and not in the field, their scores were not considered in these results.³³ One hundred girls and women ranging in age from 11 to 56 (with a mean age of 17.5) participated in the exercise as research subjects.

The team members sat behind a line of long tables in a room at the Haven, while the girls and women were led into the room, fully clothed, one at a time. Girls were presented in no particular order, based only on the pseudo-random method by which they queued up. Each participant spent approximately 20 to 30 seconds in front of the team members, as a facilitator asked them to smile so their teeth could be inspected as well as their face and body. Once each participant left the room, the team members spent a few seconds estimating her age and recording it onto sheets that were later entered into a database. Subsequently, a facilitator called out the true age of the participant. Team members used the information on their accuracies and inaccuracies to attempt to improve their own future estimations. In addition, team members periodically conferred among themselves, such that those with higher error rates took age estimation advice from those with lower error rates.

³³ We included them in the age estimation training because we originally anticipated that they would end up carrying out some observations in the field. We underestimated the amount of work involved in staffing the command center. Once the study was underway, it quickly became clear that we would not be able to send command center staff into the field to carry out observations because they were much too busy. During the next two waves of data collection, the command center will need additional staffing.

Table 1 provides overall estimation rates for all 100 subjects, for each of the eight CJA investigators as well as each of the IJM investigators, along with group averages.³⁴ Four sets of figures are provided: the percent of perfect guesses (exact age), the percent of guesses correct within plus or minus one year, the percent of guesses correct within plus or minus two years, and the percent of correct identifications of minor or adult status. For the CJA team, the average accuracy rates were 20.6% (exact age), 49.8% (within one year), 70.3% (within two years), and 85.8% (status as minor).³⁵ IJM averages were slightly higher, at 24%, 58%, 79.3%, and 89%.

TABLE 1: Overall Estimation Rates by Team Members for Full Sample

Individual	% Correct guesses (exact age)	% Correct guesses (within 1 year of exact age)	% Correct guesses (within 2 years of exact age)	% Correct guesses (whether a minor or an adult)
CJA 1	22%	48%	72%	87%
CJA 2	24%	58%	76%	92%
CJA 3	20%	49%	69%	80%
CJA 4	16%	49%	65%	86%
CJA 5	17%	40%	65%	80%
CJA 6	15%	46%	65%	84%
CJA 7	28%	58%	78%	89%
CJA 8	23%	50%	72%	88%
<i>CJA Team Avg.</i>	<i>20.6%</i>	<i>49.8%</i>	<i>70.3%</i>	<i>85.8%</i>
IJM 1	21%	56%	77%	89%
IJM 2	23%	57%	77%	91%
IJM 3	28%	61%	84%	87%
<i>IJM Team Avg.</i>	<i>24%</i>	<i>58%</i>	<i>79.3%</i>	<i>89%</i>

³⁴ The CJA investigators included seven university-based criminologists and one young police officer with no experience in carrying out undercover criminal investigations involving juveniles. We were concerned that some people might view the team as lacking the kind of street-level experience or judgment to estimate ages accurately. On the other hand, the IJM investigators are all seasoned criminal investigators with decades of law enforcement experience. We reported the results of both groups because we wanted to determine whether CJA's investigators would be able to make age estimation judgments that were comparable to those of seasoned criminal investigators.

³⁵ When the two command-post members of the CJA team (who did not serve in the field) are included in the figures, the CJA team averages fluctuate slightly. The following are these averages for the percentage of correct guesses for exact age, within one year, within two years, and for adult versus minor status for each of the three tables in this section. Table 1: 19.6%, 50%, 71.6%, 86.9%; Table 2: 20.8%, 56%, 78.4%, 93%; Table 3: 23.2%, 63.2%, 83.2%, 95.6%.

Because the team members were constantly gaining feedback during this exercise, it is instructive to view the same analyses on successive subgroups of participants. This analysis is provided in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 presents estimation rates for the *second set of 50* girls and women, and Table 3 provides estimation rates for the *final 25* participants.

As Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate, the CJA team improved fairly consistently over the course of the exercise. For the last half of the sample, the team averaged 21.5% exact guesses, 55.5% within one year, 77.8% within two years, and 92% for status as minor. For the final quartile of the sample, the average figures were 24%, 64.5%, 83%, and 95%. The overall accuracy rates for the final quartile were almost identical between the CJA and the IJM teams. *It is most noteworthy that for both teams, members were accurately identifying girls and women as minors nineteen times out of twenty.*

TABLE 2: Overall Estimation Rates by Team Members for Final 50 Participants

Individual	% Correct guesses (exact age)	% Correct guesses (within 1 year of exact age)	% Correct guesses (within 2 years of exact age)	% Correct guesses (whether a minor or an adult)
CJA 1	22%	50%	74%	94%
CJA 2	30%	68%	86%	96%
CJA 3	18%	58%	82%	86%
CJA 4	20%	60%	72%	92%
CJA 5	16%	40%	72%	90%
CJA 6	14%	54%	78%	90%
CJA 7	24%	56%	80%	96%
CJA 8	28%	60%	78%	92%
<i>CJA Team Avg.</i>	<i>21.5%</i>	<i>55.8%</i>	<i>77.8%</i>	<i>92%</i>
IJM 1	28%	62%	80%	94%
IJM 2	22%	58%	76%	96%
IJM 3	32%	72%	84%	96%
<i>IJM Team Avg.</i>	<i>27.3%</i>	<i>64%</i>	<i>80%</i>	<i>95.3%</i>

TABLE 3: Overall Estimation Rates by Team Members for Final 25 Participants

Individual	% Correct guesses (exact age)	% Correct guesses (within 1 year of exact age)	% Correct guesses (within 2 years of exact age)	% Correct guesses (whether a minor or an adult)
CJA 1	20%	40%	64%	96%
CJA 2	32%	80%	96%	96%
CJA 3	24%	72%	88%	92%
CJA 4	16%	72%	80%	92%
CJA 5	20%	52%	76%	96%
CJA 6	12%	64%	84%	88%
CJA 7	32%	60%	88%	100%
CJA 8	36%	76%	88%	100%
<i>CJA Team Avg.</i>	<i>24%</i>	<i>64.5%</i>	<i>83%</i>	<i>95%</i>
IJM 1	16%	52%	80%	96%
IJM 2	24%	56%	76%	96%
IJM 3	32%	72%	84%	96%
<i>IJM Team Avg.</i>	<i>24%</i>	<i>60%</i>	<i>80%</i>	<i>96%</i>

Age Confirmation Procedures

The research on age estimation in a clinical setting suggests that the best approach is a dental x-ray to measure dental age, an x-ray of the left hand to measure bone or skeletal age, and a thorough exam by a physician familiar with the age group being studied. Obviously, these clinical methods are not feasible in a field study like this one. We investigated the possible use of passive biometric technologies that could be used in the field but were unable to locate any with a sufficient scientific basis. Because there are not currently any clearly reliable methods for estimating age in a field setting (as opposed to a clinical setting), we chose to rely first and foremost on the judgment of our investigators. The age verification exercise we conducted established some of the parameters for determining the accuracy of our estimates.³⁶ That exercise was only a simulation, of course. In some ways it provided advantages

³⁶ We attempted to gather information from participants in the age estimation exercise about how they made their judgments. We found that there was not a clearly defined set of physical features or cues that people used in developing their age estimates. Most had difficulty describing their decision-making process in detail. They described it as having emerged quickly based on a totality of the circumstances. The process appeared to resemble what people normally think of as intuition but what Malcolm Gladwell has more recently described as “rapid cognition.” See M. Gladwell (2006). *Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking*. London: Penguin.

we did not have in the field (such as good lighting and clothing chosen by the participants),³⁷ while in other ways it was probably easier to estimate ages in the field.³⁸

Our age verification procedure was based on the idea of multiple forms of confirmation. Our investigative teams used a combination of their scripts and their judgment to estimate the number of minors in an establishment or other settings. The first method was simply visual observation—investigative partners would routinely observe all of the commercially exploited persons in an establishment or other setting and each arrive at an independent estimate of the number of minors, discussing any discrepancies and usually hatching a quick plan for confirming their suspicions. They would then build rapport with prostituted individuals or their primary intermediaries, using scripts or improvised conversational techniques to gather data on age and other matters. They would work through any perceived dishonesty, attempting to use either trust or trickery to get a girl to reveal the truth not only about her own age but the ages of others as well.

Our investigators were unanimous in their assessment, based on their experiences in the field, that minors are coached to lie about their ages, saying they are 18 or older. On several occasions, we found girls within the same establishment reporting the same birthdate (month, day, and year)—clearly an indicator of age coaching. Our investigators used several methods to work through this problem. The most common was simply trust building, getting a girl to trust that we were “safe.” Using these various improvised methods, all of our investigative teams were able to detect girls lying.

In most establishments, our investigators would each talk to at least one person privately to ensure a minimum of two additional data points, often talking to more than one person each. The goal was for the investigators to have several pieces of information available to them during their deliberations about the number of minors they observed: information from their own separate observations,

37 The lighting in the field was often suboptimal, either because our investigators were in dark bars or outside locations at night. Participants in the exercise wore their own clothing, which sometimes contained clues about their age (for instance, a picture of a teddy bear on a girl’s shirt might indicate that she is younger than she looks). While some girls in the field wore their own clothing, many of them wore outfits or costumes selected by bar staff.

38 Two factors presumably made it easier to estimate a girl’s age in the field through observations alone. First, our investigators usually had as much time as they needed to view the girls in the field than they had during the exercise, in which they were able to view the girls for no more than 20 or 30 seconds. Second, the girls in the field often wore much less clothing, making it easier to view body parts that might provide indications of their age.

information from a primary intermediary (Mamasan,³⁹ brothel owner, or pimp), and information from multiple prostituted persons in an establishment. In most instances, these multiple forms of confirmation were sufficient for reaching a common estimate of the number of minors. In those cases where the primary investigative team was either unable to gather the necessary information or gathered conflicting information, the command center sent another team (usually the roving team) in to do a revisit. IJM also provided CJA with hidden video recording equipment so we could capture video images of girls or locations where we were unable to resolve questions about minor status. Our thinking was that these images could be viewed later by a forensic anthropologist or a pediatrician specializing in Filipina girls specifically or Asian girls more generally. Although we used the camera to capture dozens of video images, in the end it was not necessary. We did not need it for verification since we were able to use our routine verification methods in nearly every case. Our approach of generating multiple points of confirmation provided us with the information we needed.

39 A “Mamasan” is a woman who is in charge of the prostituted or commercially exploited girls. She typically provides their housing and food, schedules their work, and disciplines them. We spoke with dozens of Mamasans and we also spoke with the girls about their Mamasans. In most instances, the girls told us the Mamasan is a good resource for them, providing them with food and shelter. In some instances, the girls clearly feared the Mamasan and viewed her as mean, unfair, or ruthless.

VI. FINDINGS

The primary focus of the baseline study was to collect data on nine indicators selected by IJM as proxies for the availability of child sex trafficking victims. This section reviews the study's findings on each of these nine indicators. More detailed data on these indicators as well as other data from the baseline study are listed in tabular form in Appendix 2 (summary of establishment data) and Appendix 3 (summary of data on attempts).

Indicator 1: Number of children trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation found in target area

There were a total of 88 minor trafficking victims found in establishments and 15 found not in establishments (for a total of 103).⁴⁰ Note that these 88 victims were found in a total of 115 visitations, but since some of these were establishments visited twice, there were only 94 establishments (plus 21 revisits) comprising the set of establishments. Overall, we found 1,550 commercial sex workers, of which 1,493 were in establishments and 57 were in non-establishments. Thus, 5.9% of sex workers found in establishments were confirmed minors, and 6.6% of the total number of sex workers found were minors.

Indicator 2: Elapsed time to locate a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation

Of the 53 global attempts ending successfully, the total time to find a minor (which includes the total number of minutes in each of the sub-attempts for that global attempt) was 6,992 minutes (116.5 hours). That is an average of 113 minutes per attempt, with a minimum of 13 minutes and a

40 One of the concerns typically raised in studies like this one is double counting. While we cannot be certain that there was not some double counting, we have several reasons to believe it unlikely. First, three of the four investigative teams were assigned to zones. Other than in a handful of isolated instances, they were visiting separate communities in the Cebu metropolitan area. Second, although the roving team was not assigned to a zone, it coordinated its work with the three primary teams, so it was visiting separate establishments. Third, the teams were in regular contact with one another, sharing the details of their work nearly every day. If we were counting the same people, we believe it would have become evident during these meetings and telephone conversations. Fourth, the command center coordinated the work of the various teams and collected their data. Command center staff would likely have detected double counting if it occurred. The closest we believe we came to double counting was when two of our investigative teams ended up hiring the same pimp at separate times in Kamagayan. Our security director quickly detected this problem and issued an alert (using a cell phone text message) to all investigators. Although we cannot guarantee there was no double counting, we believe there were sufficient safeguards in place to prevent it.

maximum of 342 minutes.⁴¹ We were not able to detect any temporal patterns in these elapsed times (there were no significant changes in elapsed times as the study progressed); however, there was a spatial pattern, as average elapsed time to find a minor was 72.2 minutes in Cebu City, 95.8 minutes in Lapu Lapu, and 37.4 minutes in Mandaue City.⁴²

Indicator 3: Number of attempts to locate a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation

Of the 159 sub-attempts in this study, 136 (85.5%) of them ended successfully when one of our investigators located a minor sex trafficking victim in person. The average number of attempts to locate a minor sex trafficking victim before meeting one (or more) in person was 2.57. Of the 159 total sub-attempts made by the team, our investigators were promised a total of 56 minors.

Indicator 4: Number of establishments offering a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation

Total number of bars/brothels/massage parlors (establishments): 94. Of these, 18 promised minors, and 35 had confirmed minors. Forty-one either promised minors or had confirmed minors. Of the 88 total confirmed minors found in establishments, 82 were found in bars, 6 were found in brothels, and 0 were found in massage parlors.

Indicator 5: Number of people not affiliated with commercial sex establishments offering a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation

Six people not affiliated with establishments made promises of minors. These included pimps, street-walkers, and taxi drivers.⁴³

41 Note also that there are two possible ways of interpreting the time of a global attempt. One way would be to begin the clock at the start of the first sub-attempt and compute the hours transpiring until successfully finding a minor. The problem with this approach is that between sub-attempts, there was much time spent not attempting to find a minor (e.g., sleeping, team meetings, traveling from location to location, etc.). For this reason, we decided to operationalize total time to find a minor as comprising the total time in each sub-attempt leading up to a successful attempt.

42 IJM expressed interest in knowing whether using certain types of secondary intermediaries enabled us to reduce this elapsed time. We learned very quickly that taxicabs were the fastest way to find prostituted females. Some taxi drivers claimed ignorance about where to find minors, while others were confident that they knew where to take us. When we used other kinds of secondary intermediaries (such as a bellhop, a barber, or a person on the street), we still needed a cab to drive us to those locations. Since the taxi drivers seemed to have so much knowledge of the local commercial sex trade, we relied on them much more than other kinds of secondary intermediaries. Therefore, we are unable to report meaningful empirical assessments on whether one kind of intermediary is more efficient than others.

43 During the revisions of this report, IJM asked whether we could produce an estimate of the percentage of the total number of unaffiliated persons who offered minors out the total unaffiliated persons we approached. Because

Indicator 6: Price charged for purchasing the services of a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation

There were a total of 54 sets of minors (one or more, with the same price attached to each) located, and of these, pricing information was available for 40 sets and missing for 14. Price is measured as maximum (“bar fine” plus girl), although in some cases the price is missing a negotiable extra fee or tip for the girl.⁴⁴ The minimum was P 500, the maximum was P 6000, and the average was P 3010. The nature of the service that a customer could expect varied somewhat across these transactions. Typically, however, the price included taking the girl away for the whole night and performing manual sex acts and intercourse. Oral sex was typically described as being solely at the discretion of the girl. Nearly everybody we spoke with was adamant that anal sex was out of the question.⁴⁵ We did not systematically record prices for what the locals referred to as “short time” transactions (taking the girl away for approximately two hours). We also did not systematically record prices for hiring girls to sit with us in private VIP rooms in bars. In higher-class establishments, renting a VIP room was typically a moneymaking scheme for both the girl and the bar; sexual services were not routinely offered to customers in those settings. In lower-class establishments, renting a private room did tend to come with the expectation of sexual services. For example, in one such establishment, our investigator paid to bring a girl into a private room (essentially a small, dark, dirty closet). Once inside, the

we did not plan to produce such an estimate, it would be difficult to do so with any degree of precision. In some environments, such as in the back seat of a taxicab or standing outside a club located in a safe area, it was easy to capture and record data. However, many of our conversations with primary and secondary intermediaries, particularly those that took place outdoors in distressed areas like Kamagayan, occurred in a chaotic, potentially dangerous environment in which our investigators were surrounded by pimps, street hustlers, and assorted other characters. In such an environment, it was difficult to capture and record data in a way that did not jeopardize our safety. Our data collection protocol required our investigators to commit several facts to short-term memory until it was safe to transmit those facts to the command center. This made it difficult to record data systematically that were not on our data collection protocol, though we attempted to do so in our field notes.

- 44 A bar fine is the price for removing a prostituted girl from a bar. We were quoted prices using two different types of bar fines: one type in which the money paid to the bar is split with the girl, and another type in which the money paid to the bar is for the bar only and the customer needs to negotiate the remainder of the price with the girl. In both cases, tipping is expected on top of the bar fine.
- 45 We did not systematically track prices for “short time” sexual encounters or for specific sex acts. We systematically tracked prices for the modal type of sexual transaction in the Cebu area, which involved taking a girl away for the whole night and having manual sexual contact and/or intercourse with her. Depending on the personal preferences or style of the girl, this transaction may or may not include oral sex. Our understanding is that girls would typically provide oral sex as part of their efforts to secure a larger gratuity from the customer, but this is just our collective impression based on our conversations with the girls, not the result of systematic data collection and analysis.

girl immediately attempted to perform oral sex on him. The nature of this transaction suggested that customers who rented a private room at this bar could routinely expect oral sex.

Indicator 7: Percent of total attempts to procure a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation that results in the presumed facilitator, victim, or prostituted or commercially exploited adult citing the police/law enforcement as the reason why a minor is unavailable

Of the 159 total attempts to find a minor (sub-attempts), in 28 cases (17.6%) either the prostituted or commercially exploited person or the intermediary mentioned laws or law enforcement.

Indicator 8: Incidence/type of security measures at establishments taken to guard against police enforcement

There were 94 establishments visited, and 21 were revisited for a total of 115 establishment visits. The following distributions of security procedures include all 115 rather than 94, because an establishment may have varying security measures on multiple visits. On average, there were 1.17 doormen per establishment, including 48 with no doormen, 35 with one, 12 with two, 14 with three, 3 with three, 1 with five, 1 with six, and 1 with ten. On average, only about a third (0.38) of the doormen were armed with a firearm, including 75 with no armed doormen, 36 with one, and 4 with two. Our investigators were frisked or patted down in only three of the 115 establishments for which data were available. They were not searched electronically (with a handheld metal detector, for instance) in any of the establishments.

VII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

So far in this report, we have discussed the context for the baseline measurement study and presented a variety of quantitative results on eight indicators of sexual trafficking in minors in Cebu. Here we want to share some additional observations on sex trafficking in Cebu as well as some ideas about the methodology and logistics for carrying out studies of the problem.

At the start of this study, CJA knew very little about the commercial sex industry and the characteristics of sex trafficking in Cebu. We attended some training and information sessions with experienced investigators. We read websites devoted to sex tourism. We read field notes prepared by investigators who had conducted reconnaissance of sex tourism in Cebu. Other than those distant forms of preparation, our investigators had very little experience in studying sex trafficking and no experience in examining it in the field. Thus, it would be reasonable to expect that our investigators might experience a learning curve once they were placed in the field. Our anecdotal impression is that this learning curve happened very quickly: the investigative teams were able to improvise their own scripts and routines very quickly and easily. Our analysis of the quantitative data failed to detect a statistically significant change in the amount of time it took our teams to find a minor as the study progressed. A cynical interpretation could be that we did not get any better at detecting minors. Our more optimistic interpretation is that finding minors was not that difficult, so our investigators were successful at it right out of the starting gate.

Although finding minors was not difficult, it did take some persistence. Our experience suggests that people linked closely to the sex trade in Cebu have been trained or coached to tell sex tourists that minors are unavailable. Our investigators found intermediaries routinely trying to talk them into being with 18- or 19-year-old girls. Although they often did not mention laws or law enforcement explicitly, there appeared to be a common subtext that being with minors was risky. It was here that our investigators' efforts to build rapport, build trust, and improvise seemed to bear fruit. In some cases, where it seemed like the intermediary might have some kind of moral objection, it meant taking the conversation in a serious direction, such as discussing our wish to find a young wife and give her a good life in the United States. In other cases where it seemed the intermediary had no moral objection, it might mean relying on some kind of (unfortunate) male bonding ritual over the pleasures of being with a young girl. In many cases, the initial resistance to connecting us with minors almost seemed like token resistance. The core of this study turned out to be pushing past people's initial resistance to connecting us with minors.

The findings of our study confirm much of what we read and learned before we carried out the baseline data collection. There was one important difference. We anticipated being able to find preteens rather easily. Once on the ground in Cebu, despite our best efforts, we were unable to find them. Even when we talked about finding a young girl to take care of, to give a better life, we were unable to find very young girls. Most of the minors we discovered were 16–17 years old.

We also found substantial differences in the nature of prostitution and commercial sexual exploitation according to the type of establishment and its location. The high-end karaoke bars are clean and well kept; they charge higher prices for drinks and for bar fines. The girls typically described to us living conditions that satisfied them at some basic level. They lived with and enjoyed the friendship of the other girls, were fed by the Mamasan, attended health screenings by the local government on a regular basis, and by and large appeared healthy. Some of the minors in these locations told us they had submitted false identification paperwork to the bar in order to get the job. While some fit the conventional image of trafficking victims, in the sense of having been taken away from their home involuntarily, many in the high-end establishments appear to have sought out this kind of work due to economic necessity.

The low-end bars and brothels, such as those located in Kamagayan, were very different. Many of the girls had rotting teeth, were wearing old and worn clothing, and showed visible signs of poor health and living in poor conditions (dried skin, greasy hair, brown or broken teeth, etc.). These girls more clearly fit the conventional image of trafficking victims. Many of them described their journey from the provinces (chiefly Mindanao) and how they are moved around to different cities depending on the demand for their services. They shared heartfelt stories of broken homes or missing their families. These girls received very little of the money paid to the Mamasan or the pimp to procure their services. We took several of them on short dates to malls or restaurants, purchased food, clothing, or shoes for them, and tipped them. They were typically nervous that somebody would take the tip money away from them when they returned. Some asked us not to tip them in front of the taxi driver who was bringing them home because they were afraid he would tell their pimp or Mamasan about the tip.

Methodology and Logistics

Our experience in the baseline study also provided a number of lessons about how to carry out studies like this in the future. First, we would have benefited from having either one additional investigative team or a little bit more time in the field (probably about two days). We came close to exhausting the population of establishments in Lapu Lapu and Mandaue City, but we needed more time in Cebu City and particularly in Kamagayan. Kamagayan is so small and concentrated that it presents

particular challenges that would really require a longer-term study using methods suited to its unique characteristics.

Second, our status as westerners was mostly an asset because it assuaged fears about whether we were police officers and allowed us to break through people's resistance about the availability of minors for sex. At the same time, it might have been useful to have one additional team consisting solely of two Filipino investigators. This would be particularly useful in Kamagayan and other distressed areas, as well as in the bars catering primarily to Filipinos. We went to those places anyway, and we were successful in finding minors, but it would have been useful to have a Filipino team in place with us to help us figure out what we might have missed. We suspect, for instance, that prices for purchasing sexual services in some areas are probably greater for sex tourists than for Filipinos.

Third, we underestimated the effect that fatigue and jet lag would have on the team's performance. Our investigators had difficulty recording their field notes at the end of their shifts without falling asleep or experiencing memory problems, and our command center personnel had difficulty remaining awake across the wide range of hours that the investigative teams worked. It would be useful to have a small team of research assistants with responsibility for helping to cover the command center and helping the investigative teams assemble their field notes at the end of the night. Most members of the CJA team got sick while in Cebu or immediately upon their return, a fact we attribute largely to excessive fatigue. We don't think these issues affected our quantitative data substantially, because these data were transmitted to the command center by telephone or text message directly from the field, but they clearly affected our ability to capture high quality, descriptive field notes in a consistent way that would have benefited the study.

Fourth, we purchased telephones for every team member at the outset of this study. Some were inexpensive and had few extra features, while some had cameras and voice recorders included. We cannot emphasize strongly enough the utility of having a voice recorder available on each investigator's telephone. The voice recorder enables the investigator to take brief breaks and update his notes. At the end of the evening, these accumulated notes make the job of writing field notes and checking data quality much easier. Having a telephone with a camera for still shots and brief video footage is also useful, though not essential.

Overall, we are confident that in spite of numerous methodological and logistical challenges, the data we collected constitute an accurate picture of prostitution and commercial sexual exploitation in Cebu. Our investigators were surprised at the extent to which their separate attempts to explore prostitution and sex trafficking resulted in a consistent overall understanding of the problem. We

applaud IJM for its willingness to expose their interventions to the scrutiny of an independent evaluation and we encourage other reformers interested in reducing human sex trafficking to do the same. The result will be an increased understanding of the problem and hopefully an enhanced capacity to implement effective solutions.

APPENDIX 1: PROJECT TEAM

Professor Ed Maguire is a criminologist at George Mason University in Manassas, Virginia. Professor Maguire has held previous research and teaching positions at the United Nations in Vienna, Austria, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the University of Nebraska. Professor Maguire specializes in issues related to policing and violent crime. Currently, he is diagnosing the causes of a violent crime outbreak for the police and the Ministry of National Security in Trinidad and Tobago. He has provided lectures, training, research, and evaluation services to police agencies around the world. He has been doing consulting in crime and justice for more than a decade. Dr. Maguire served as the Project Director and one of the investigators on the project.

Professor Melchor DeGuzman is a criminologist at the University of Tennessee in Chattanooga. He received his Ph.D. in criminal justice from the University of Cincinnati in 2001. Professor DeGuzman is a Filipino national whose doctoral dissertation examined the culture of the Philippine police. Dr. DeGuzman served as an investigator on the project, focusing especially on establishments that cater primarily to Filipinos.

Mr. Dominick ("Nick") Giangrosso is an expert in criminal investigations and security. He is a 14-year veteran of the Baltimore City Police Department having served 1.5 years in patrol, 1.5 years as a Detective assigned to Vice and Sex Offenses, and then 11 years in Homicide, including 5 years as a Squad Leader. He has also served as a Special Investigator with the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Assassinations (President Kennedy and Martin Luther King) for six months. He spent 1.5 years as a consultant to the Cold Case Unit of the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington DC. He served as the Divisional Vice President of Corporate Security with Joseph A. Bank Clothiers in Baltimore, MD for 24 years, where he was responsible for all corporate security/loss prevention issues. For the past three years, he has served as a contractual Special Investigator (with Top Secret clearance); in that role, he completes background investigations for high level, classified clearances for three U.S. federal agencies. In January and February 2006, he completed training for 105 homicide investigators in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. Mr. Giangrosso served as the project's security director.

Professor Charles Katz is a criminologist at Arizona State University in Phoenix, Arizona. Professor Katz is an expert on gangs. He recently completed a book, *Policing Gangs in America*, detailing his research on how American police departments define and respond to gang problems in their communities. In addition, Professor Katz has considerable experience and expertise in designing strategic crime control initiatives. Dr. Katz served as the Assistant Project Director and one of the investigators on the project.

Professor William King is a criminologist at Bowling Green State University in Bowling Green, Ohio. He is an expert in forensic evidence processing and criminal investigation techniques. Professor King has worked closely with police departments around the United States. In Trinidad and Tobago, Professor King recently provided training on homicide investigations for 105 detectives. He was also instrumental in revising the entire system of physical evidence processing by the police and the forensic science laboratory. Dr. King served as one of the investigators on the project.

Mr. James Krause has served as a police officer in Fairfax County, Virginia for five years. He has worked on a variety of assignments, including a recent stint as a plain-clothes officer working a variety of case types. Officer Krause served as one of the investigators on the project.

Professor Joe Kuhns is a criminologist at the University of North Carolina in Charlotte. He is a former U.S. Department of Justice official with expertise in drugs, violence, prostitution, and community policing. In Trinidad and Tobago, he is assessing the extent to which drugs are responsible for contributing to an outbreak of violent crime. For a previous research project, Professor Kuhns conducted 45-minute interviews with 112 street-level prostitutes and female arrestees about drug use, condom use, sexually transmitted diseases, and other public health issues. In other research, he has examined the links between child abuse, prostitution, teenage pregnancy, and promiscuity. He is currently doing a study of “johns” in Charlotte, NC and their motivations for soliciting prostitutes. Dr. Kuhns served as the data manager for the project.

Professor Jeffrey Snipes is a criminologist in the Program in Criminal Justice Studies at San Francisco State University. He received his M.A. from Penn State University in 1991, his Ph.D. in Criminal Justice at the State University of New York at Albany in 2002, and his J.D. at Stanford University in 2001. His work experience is diverse and includes the following positions: data analyst at the U.S. Department of Justice; legal internships and externships at various civil rights organizations, including the ACLU of Northern California; site organizer of studies of policing in the United States; and site organizer of a major project on police reform in Trinidad and Tobago, including an ongoing consultancy maintaining and analyzing police complaints data as well as implementing violence-reduction strategies. He is co-author of a major academic text, *Theoretical Criminology*, which has been translated into several languages, and of numerous articles on criminological and criminal justice issues. Dr. Snipes served as one of the investigators on the project as well as the chief data analyst.

Professor William Wells is a criminologist and Interim Director of the Center for the Study of Crime, Delinquency, and Corrections at Southern Illinois University Carbondale. His research interests include firearms-related crime and violence, strategies to reduce firearms-related problems, and community policing. Dr. Wells was co-principal investigator on a National Institute of Justice project

that studied the effects of shelter services on intimate partner homicide in California. His most recent work has examined the effects of neighborhood variables on citizens' responses to neighborhood problems and the outcomes of a training program that seeks to improve police officer responses to persons with a mental illness. Dr. Wells served as one of the investigators on the project.

Professor Jihong "Solomon" Zhao is a criminologist at the University of Nebraska. He is an expert in the relationship between policing and crime. Professor Zhao has worked closely with police departments in the United States and China on community policing and crime control projects. Dr. Zhao served as one of the investigators on the project, focusing especially on establishments that cater to Asian sex tourists.

APPENDIX 2: SUMMARY OF ESTABLISHMENT DATA

Variable	All Areas	Lapu Lapu	Mandaue City	Cebu City
Total number of visits	115	48	14	53
Bars	84	34	10	40
Brothels	12	5	2	5
Massage parlors	19	9	2	8
Total establishments visited	94	38	12	44
Bars	66	26	9	31
Brothels	11	4	2	5
Massage parlors	17	8	1	8
Number of establishments with confirmed minors	35	15	4	16
Total confirmed minors	88 (82 bars/ 6 brothels)	40 (38/2)	16 (16/0)	32 (28/4)
Average number of confirmed minors at establishments with minors	2.5	2.7	4.0	2.0
Average # sex workers				
Bars	22.6	20.1	21.6	25.6
Brothels	17.8	40.0	N/A	3.0
Massage parlors	5.3	2.6	30.0	1.3
Average # working that occasion				
Bars	16.5	11.3	18.4	20.6
Brothels	13.0	23.7	N/A	2.3
Massage parlors	3.2	1.3	20.0	0.71
Average # found by field workers				
Bars	16.0	14.7	13.9	17.6
Brothels	12.5	18.0	N/A	7.0
Massage parlors	2.9	1.3	13.5	2.0

Variable	All Areas	Lapu Lapu	Mandaue City	Cebu City
Average # suspected to be minor				
Bars	2.0	2.2	1.7	2.0
Brothels	2.2	3.2	0	2.0
Massage parlors	0.11	0	0	0.25
Average # confirmed minors				
Bars	0.98	0.82	1.6	0.95
Brothels	0.50	0.80	0	0.40
Massage parlors	0	0	0	0
Percentage confirmed minors of sex workers found (Minors/Sex Workers Found)				
Bars	6.2% (82/131)	5.8% (28/486)	11.5% (16/139)	5.6% (38/688)
Brothels	4.8% (6/125)	4.4% (4/90)	0% (0/0)	5.7% (2/35)
Massage parlors	0% (0/55)	0% (0/12)	0% (0/27)	0% (0/16)
All	5.9% (88/1493)	5.4% (32/588)	9.6% (16/166)	5.4% (40/739)
Security (Based on 115 visits of 94 establishments)				
Doormen per establishment	1.17			
# visits with no doormen	48			
# visits with one doorman	35			
# visits with two or more doormen	32			
# visits with armed doormen	40			
# visits where field workers frisked	3			
# visits where field workers searched electronically	0			

APPENDIX 3: SUMMARY OF DATA ON ATTEMPTS

Description of Variable	Amount
Number of global attempts to find minor sex workers	66
Number terminated administratively	13
Number ending in locating a confirmed minor	53
Total time in the 53 successful attempts	116.5 hours
Average minutes per attempt (time to locate a minor)	113
Minimum minutes per attempt	13
Maximum minutes per attempt	342
Number of sub-attempts to find minor sex workers	159
Number in global attempts that were terminated administratively	23
Number in global attempts that were successful	136
Average number of sub-attempts per successful global attempt	2.57
Minors promised in 159 sub-attempts	56
Minors confirmed in establishments	88
Minors confirmed outside of establishments	15
Total confirmed minors	103
Total sex workers found in establishments	1,493
Total sex workers found outside of establishments	57
Total sex workers found	1,550
54 sets of minors were found, and pricing was available for 40 sets	
Average price, including bar fine if any and price for sex worker	P 3010
Range of prices for minor sex workers	P 500–P 6000
Number and percentage of 159 total sub-attempts in which either a sex worker or an intermediary mentioned law enforcement or laws against minor sex workers	28 (17.6%)

ABOUT CJA

CJA is a consulting firm based in Northern Virginia near Washington, DC. The firm provides training, technical assistance, research, evaluation, and other services related to crime prevention and criminal justice. CJA's services are provided by a network of scholars and professionals with backgrounds primarily in social science, policing, law, and forensics. CJA specializes in using cutting-edge analysis and collaborative strategies to improve the capacity of organizations and governments for reducing crime and enhancing justice.



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