




WAVE 3 ASSESSMENT FOR PROJECT LANTERN

October 13, 2010



PROJECT
LANTERN.



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Top cover photograph: “Main Street”

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Cover design by Adagio Digital Arts

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We want to thank a number of individuals for their assistance with this project.

IJM's Manila office hosted us on multiple occasions over the past four years, providing training to our staff, arranging age estimation exercises, and enabling us to practice our methodology in Manila bars. We are grateful for their unflinching support over the past four years.

IJM's Cebu office shared their expertise, working closely with our command center staff and our field investigators. IJM investigators provided outstanding security services in the field, working in close partnership with our team, following us into neighborhoods where the sex trade thrives and sticking with us as we wandered occasionally into dangerous areas. Members of the CJA team were often relieved to see IJM staff blending into the shadows, looking out for their safety, sometimes in the middle of the night while they were in distressed neighborhoods surrounded by pimps and hustlers. The IJM investigators watched our backs and we are grateful for their efforts.

David Shaw has been our primary administrative point of contact at IJM headquarters. We are grateful to Dave for his consistent patience and responsiveness. We are also grateful to the many other IJM employees who provided ideas and help in various portions of the study.

We are grateful to our team of criminologists and police officers for their willingness to place themselves at risk, venturing into the unknown to increase the knowledge base on the sexual trafficking of minors. This project required team members to make numerous sacrifices, including spending time away from loved ones, placing themselves in harm's way, and doing emotionally toxic work. We have never worked with a group of people so committed and passionate who gave so much of themselves to a project.

Many of the women and girls whom we met during the course of this study shared with us their hopes and dreams for a better life. During our brief time with them, we took them shopping, took walks with them, bought meals or ice cream sundaes for them, laughed with them, and listened to their stories. We hope the results of this study will help make a difference their lives and in the lives of others like them.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the findings from a study conducted in May 2010 to examine sexual trafficking of minors in Cebu, Philippines. The study was conducted by Crime and Justice Analysts, Inc. (CJA), an independent research and evaluation firm specializing in crime and criminal justice issues.

International Justice Mission® (IJM) retained CJA to support its work in reducing the number of child sex trafficking victims by conducting a formal, scientific study collecting quantitative data to help measure the impact of its Project Lantern initiative. The project is designed to reduce the incidence of child sex trafficking in the target area by strengthening local capacity to successfully locate, arrest, and prosecute perpetrators, thereby leading to increased expectations of criminal sanctions for violating trafficking laws.

The wave 3 study described in this report is the final of three waves of data collection designed to measure the availability of child sex-trafficking victims in Cebu. Wave 1 of this study was conducted in October of 2006 and wave 2 was conducted in August 2008. We also present findings here comparing data across the three waves of data collection. Together these three waves of data will be used by IJM and its contractors to evaluate the effectiveness of Project Lantern. IJM provided CJA with a list of eight indicators or proxies intended to measure the availability of child sex trafficking victims. During wave 3, CJA deployed a team of 11 people (including eight investigators, two data collection staff, and one security director) to the Philippines for training and data collection. The eight investigators each spent seven nights visiting bars, brothels, massage parlors, malls, red light districts, and other locations where people seeking sex go to find prostituted or commercially exploited women and girls.

The eight investigators engaged in training on age estimation and used a number of age-confirmation processes to determine whether someone was in fact a minor. They then posed as sex tourists and sought out prostituted or commercially exploited minors. While conducting their covert observations, the investigators systematically collected data on a number of variables having to do with the people they were meeting and the places they were visiting. As they gathered the necessary data, they submitted it regularly to a centralized command center using cellular telephones (either by voice or text). The data were entered into a master database by two data coordinators at the command center. This database, the qualitative field notes written by the investigators at the end of their shifts, and photographs and audio/visual footage taken of suspected and confirmed minors, constitute the primary data sources for the findings presented in this report.

During the course of the wave 3 study, the investigators undertook 114 visits to bars, 7 visits to brothels, 8 visits to massage parlors, 12 visits to malls, 13 street encounters, 8 pimp encounters, and 6 dates. Out of the 68 bars, 5 brothels, and 8 massage parlors visited by the investigators (some were visited multiple times), commercially exploited minors were located in 10. Altogether, the investiga-

tors observed approximately 1,369 prostituted or commercially exploited women and girls. Of these, 21 (1.5%) were confirmed as minors. Across all attempts to locate minors, it took our investigative teams, on average, 7 hours and 29 minutes to locate a minor. This report presents detailed findings from wave 3, while also providing an overview of findings from all waves of the study.

Results from the wave 1 and 2 studies confirmed the presence of prostituted or commercially exploited minors in Cebu. Wave 3 also confirmed the presence of prostituted or commercially exploited minors in Cebu, though in reduced numbers: 21 (1.5%) in wave 3 compared to 29 (2.2%) in wave 2, and 103 (6.6%) in wave 1. Our investigators routinely encountered token resistance to their efforts to find minors in wave 1. It took longer for our investigators to locate minors during wave 2. During wave 3, investigators found locating minors to be even more difficult than in the two previous waves, suggesting that the prevalence of minors in the sex trade has decreased over time. As in waves 1 and 2, the investigators were unable, despite their best efforts, to locate prostituted or commercially exploited preteens. The majority of minors discovered across all three waves of this study were 16 or 17 years old. Based on our interviews with minors, we know that many enter the sex trade through different routes, although all of them are considered “trafficking victims” under Philippine law. Some appear to seek out the work out of economic necessity; several minors told us they forged their paperwork to get the job. Others fit the more conventional image of a sex trafficking victim in the sense that they were taken involuntarily from their homes, they are moved around to work in different cities depending on customer demand, and they show visible signs of maltreatment and poor living conditions.

Over the past decade there has been an increase in the extent to which criminological interventions like Project Lantern have been subjected to independent, external evaluation to assess their effectiveness. The new emphasis on evaluation research is part of a larger movement in several disciplines toward “evidence-based” policymaking.¹ We applaud IJM and the Gates Foundation for their willingness to evaluate the effectiveness of Project Lantern. This investment in quantitative research is sorely needed to shed light on human trafficking, a topic about which much has been written but little is known.² Even relatively straightforward questions like whether prosecuting traffickers will reduce trafficking have still not been settled. For instance, one commentator noted “there is little evidence that prosecutions have any significant impact on aggregate levels of trafficking.”³ The culmination of the Project Lantern evaluation will help improve knowledge about sexual trafficking in minors, and contribute to an enhanced capacity to implement effective solutions.

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- 1 Petrosino, Anthony, Robert F. Boruch, Haluk Soydan, Lorna Duggan, and Julio Sanchez-Meca (2001). “Meeting the Challenges of Evidence-Based Policy: The Campbell Collaboration,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 578, No. 1, 14-34.
 - 2 Frank Laczko and Marco Gramegna (2003). “Developing Better Indicators of Human Trafficking,” *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, X(1): 179-194.
 - 3 David A. Feingold (2005). “Think Again: Human Trafficking,” *Foreign Policy*, September/October: 26-32 (quote from page 30).

I. INTRODUCTION

The International Justice Mission® (IJM) retained Crime and Justice Analysts, Inc. (CJA) to support its work in reducing the number of sex trafficking victims by conducting a formal, scientific study collecting quantitative data that will help measure the impact of an ongoing initiative, Project Lantern. The project is designed to reduce the incidence of sex trafficking in the target area by strengthening local capacity to successfully locate, arrest, and prosecute perpetrators, thereby leading to increased expectations of criminal sanctions for violating trafficking laws. According to IJM, this should, in turn, help deter future acts and lead to a decrease in the overall level of sex trafficking. During the course of the project, IJM has also worked with local stakeholders to ensure that rescued trafficking victims receive appropriate aftercare services.

The findings reported here represent the third and final wave in an evaluation process that IJM has executed over several years. IJM opened its office in Cebu in September 2006 and their investigative efforts in Cebu had been underway for just under three 3 years at the time of this study. According to IJM's evaluation methodology, the wave 1 baseline study was the first in a series of three in-country studies designed to measure the availability of child sex trafficking victims in Cebu, Philippines.

The baseline (wave 1) study, conducted in October 2006, was conducted prior to the implementation of any training activities or other interventions by IJM in Cebu in order to establish a baseline measure of the availability of trafficking victims. The Project Lantern initiative was launched during the time period between the wave 1 and wave 2 studies. The wave 2 study was conducted at approximately the mid-point of Project Lantern's scheduled implementation period, in August 2008. The wave 3 study described in this report was completed in May of 2010 near the end of the scheduled implementation of Project Lantern. This report describes the methodology used for collecting data and estimating the ages of sex trafficking victims during each wave, presents the findings for wave 3, compares the wave 3 findings with those from the two earlier waves, and discusses the implications of these findings for IJM's Project Lantern initiative.

II. PROJECT INDICATORS

Given the hidden and illegal nature of sex trafficking, generating an accurate count of the total population of sex trafficking victims is difficult. Without having an accurate knowledge of the total size of the sex trafficking victim population, it is difficult to measure with confidence a reduction in the absolute number of people who have been trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation.⁴

Instead of coming up with measures based on enumerating the population or its various subparts, IJM chose a list of proxy indicators that measure the *availability* of child sex trafficking victims. The indicators for which CJA was responsible for collecting data are as follows:

1. Number of children trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation found in target area.
2. Elapsed time to locate a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation.
3. Number of attempts to locate a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation.
4. Number of establishments offering a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation.
5. Number of people not affiliated with a commercial sex establishment offering a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation.
6. Price charged for purchasing the services of a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation.
7. Percentage of total attempts to procure a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation that results in the presumed facilitator, victim, or prostituted or commercially exploited person citing the police/law enforcement as the reason why a minor is not available for sex.⁵
8. Incidence/type of security measures at establishments taken to guard against police enforcement.

4 A recent compendium of research on human trafficking concluded: “Perhaps the most challenging factor is that most of the populations relevant to the study of human trafficking ...constitute so-called hidden populations. A hidden population is a group of individuals for whom the size and boundaries are unknown, and for whom no sampling frame exists.” See G. Tyldum and A. Brunovskis (2005). “Describing the Unobserved: Methodological Challenges in Empirical Studies on Human Trafficking,” p. 17 in *Data and Research on Human Trafficking: A Global Survey*, edited by F. Laczko and Elzbieta M. Godziak. New York: United Nations Publications.

5 The term “prostituted or commercially exploited women or men” is used in the Philippines to refer to commercial sex workers and is the one used by IJM’s Manila office.

IJM instructed CJA to use a definition of “sex trafficking” that is consistent with Philippines law. While Project Lantern attempts to locate and rescue both adult and child trafficking victims, for the purposes of this study, CJA was asked solely to locate minor trafficking victims. According to IJM’s interpretation of Philippines law, minors—defined as persons under the age of 18—engaged in prostitution or commercial sexual exploitation are considered “trafficking victims” even if they do not meet conventional ideas about what constitutes trafficking, such as being forced against their will to engage in sex acts or being transferred involuntarily away from their home.⁶ Minor trafficking victims can be identified through visual identification and verification through conversations with the minor directly or with a third party to glean information that confirms the age of the child (a later section of this report will address the reliability and validity of methods used to determine whether someone is a minor). Confirming that an adult is a trafficking victim, however, is much more difficult as it requires the adult to self-identify as a trafficking victim. The amount of effort and resources required to elicit such information from prostituted or commercially exploited adults was beyond the scope of this study and, in addition, could have increased the level of danger faced by CJA staff who went undercover to locate potential trafficking victims.

6 According to Section 3a of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 or Republic Act No. 9208, the term “trafficking in persons” refers to: “the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs. The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered as “trafficking in persons” even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph. According to Section 3b of the same Act, the term “child” refers to: “a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.”

III. CONDUCTING WAVE 3

The wave 3 study used the same research methodology used in the two earlier waves. The contract between CJA and IJM specified one trip to the Philippines during the wave 3 measurement period. A two-person advance team arrived in Manila on May 18, 2010 to arrange the logistics for the full team's visit.⁷ This included purchasing cell phones and supplies for the project and coordinating with IJM's Manila and Cebu offices. The remainder of the team arrived on May 19th. Three members of the wave 3 team had not participated in previous waves of the study, including one person assigned to the command center, the security director, and one of the field investigators.

An important component of each wave of the study has been providing training to team members on age-estimation procedures in the field. To mirror our experiences in previous waves, we anticipated engaging in an age-estimation exercise at a shelter facility for women and girls in Manila. Unfortunately, this exercise was canceled at the last minute due to circumstances beyond our control. As a substitute, IJM's Manila office made arrangements for the group to view photographs of women and girls to enable them to hone their abilities to estimate ages.

Following a briefing from IJM's Manila staff, investigators spent an initial evening in Manila conducting practice observations before formal field investigations commenced in Cebu. They visited go-go bars and KTV bars to begin adjusting to the setting and to working with each other as partners, as well as practicing scripts for getting acquainted with and determining the ages of Filipina women and girls. This initial night out also provided the command center staff with an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the trafficking problem and with the nature of the data that would eventually be submitted to them by investigators. IJM investigators and members of the CJA team who participated in the wave 1 and 2 studies provided feedback to other team members for whom this was a new experience. Spending time in the field practicing and adjusting to the environment is vital in a study like this, even for those members of the team who had participated in previous waves of the study.

On May 21st the full CJA team flew to Cebu to commence observations. The eight CJA investigators were divided into four teams of two. For several reasons, we chose to concentrate all our investigative teams on Mactan Island (including Lapu Lapu City) for the first two nights of observations. We also located the command center temporarily in Lapu Lapu for the first two nights of observations. The command center was comprised of three team members: a data manager, a research assistant, and a security director. The command center received phone calls and text messages from the investigative

⁷ Appendix 1 contains brief biographies of all project participants.

teams, entered this information into databases, tracked the current locations and statuses of the teams at all times, and was responsible for initiating security procedures in the event of security concerns. IJM's Cebu office assigned a staff member to the command center during every night of the study. IJM investigative staff provided additional security for CJA and routinely interacted with the command center staff to track the locations and activities of CJA investigators. On May 23, 2010, the command center relocated to Cebu City along with two of the investigative teams. These two teams commenced observations in Cebu City and Mandaue City. The two remaining teams stayed on Mactan Island for one more night to continue observations there. Teams later returned to Mactan Island temporarily to follow leads or to conduct follow-up visits, but the majority of our observations there were completed during the first three nights of the study.

Each night, the investigative teams were assigned to one of three geographic areas (Lapu Lapu, Mandaue City, and Cebu City). The investigative teams carried out systematic observations within the areas where commercial sexual exploitation is carried out with greatest frequency, including brothels, bars, hotels, streets, and other locations. Within each of the three primary study zones, the investigative teams relied on intermediaries such as taxi cab drivers, hotel staff, and other locals knowledgeable about the sex trade to refer us to locations where minor sex trafficking victims are most likely to be found. When a team finished its measurement activities within its assigned zone, it was then reassigned to assist other teams whose zones had not yet been completed.

IV. STUDY METHODOLOGY

This section outlines the methodology used during all three waves of the study. It examines sampling, measurement, data collection, and data recording. The basic means by which IJM will evaluate the impact of Project Lantern is a simple three-wave panel design that measures certain indicators of sex trafficking in the target area prior to any interventions implemented by IJM (wave 1), during the midst of the intervention period (wave 2), and then after interventions have been implemented (wave 3). These three waves of data are used to assess whether or not the interventions caused any changes in sex trafficking. Other kinds of data will also be collected by IJM on an ongoing basis to account for alternative explanations and to help isolate the causal link between project activities and changes in sex trafficking that may occur in Cebu.⁸ IJM will use these other data sources in combination with the data collected by CJA to conduct an overall impact evaluation of Project Lantern.

Prior to the wave 1 study, CJA and IJM explored the possibility of evaluating the impact of Project Lantern using an experimental design with measures being taken in treatment and control areas. The treatment areas would comprise Cebu City, Mandaue City, and Lapu-Lapu while the control areas would be other communities with a sex trafficking problem that would not receive any assistance from Project Lantern. Although adding control sites would have made good scientific sense, CJA and IJM decided not to use this approach for three reasons. First, IJM staff raised serious ethical concerns about locating minor sex trafficking victims and then not rescuing them. These kinds of ethical issues arise frequently in randomized experiments in which either potentially harmful treatments are administered to the treatment group or potentially helpful treatments (as in this case) are denied to the control group.⁹ Second, CJA anticipated some logistical difficulties in locating and screening the additional staff necessary to carry out baseline measurements in the control site on short notice (these conversations took place shortly before we fielded the wave 1 study). Third, at the time, funding had only been set aside for two waves of measurement, a baseline measurement prior to the implementation of Project Lantern, and a final measurement after the implementation was completed

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- 8 At the baseline methodology workshop (hosted by the Protection Project at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC) in the summer of 2006, IJM staff, CJA's President, and other knowledgeable participants held a lengthy discussion about the kinds of data that IJM ought to collect on a regular basis to strengthen the evaluation. The group decided on several important variables and IJM is responsible for collecting those data. These measures will be analyzed by IJM after the wave 3 data have been collected.
- 9 Resnik, David B. (2002). "The Ethics of HIV Research in Developing Nations." *Bioethics*, 12(4): 286-306; Baunach, Phyllis Jo (2006). "Random Assignment in Criminal Justice Research: Some Ethical and Legal Issues" *Criminology*, 17(4): 435-444; Short, James F. Jr., Margaret A. Zahn, and David P. Farrington (2000). "Experimental Research in Criminal Justice Settings: Is There a Role for Scholarly Societies?" *Crime and Delinquency*, 46(3): 295-298.

(approximately four years later). As we considered options for improving the strength of the evaluation design, we were faced with the choice of either adding a control site to the original two-wave study or adding an additional wave of measurement between the baseline and final measurements. CJA was concerned about the lengthy gap between these two measurement occasions. Adding another measurement occasion at the midpoint and tracking additional indicators on an ongoing basis throughout the study period was less expensive and raised fewer ethical issues for IJM than adding a control site. Experimental designs maximize what statisticians call “internal validity,” which makes them an attractive option for evaluating social interventions like Project Lantern. However, they are often difficult to put in place for ethical, financial, political, and logistical reasons.¹⁰

Sampling

CJA and IJM agreed prior to the wave 1 baseline study that the evaluation would use a “repeated measures” or panel design that examines the same phenomenon at three separate points in time. One of the most important decisions in any repeated measures study is the selection of an appropriate sampling strategy that can be replicated at each wave. Our wave 1 study report reviewed several sampling options. Readers with questions are encouraged to view these sampling strategies in the baseline report.

Consistent with the sampling approach we selected in wave 1, we decided to adopt a hybrid approach for wave 3 that enabled us to sample different populations of prostituted or commercially exploited persons using different strategies.

1. Sampling Bars and Brothels

The investigative teams sampled establishments by approaching secondary intermediaries like bellhops or taxi drivers.¹¹ Our investigators learned very quickly that taxi drivers are the primary means

10 Lum, Cynthia and Sue-Ming Yang (2005). “Why Do Evaluation Researchers in Crime and Justice Choose Non-Experimental Methods?” *Journal of Experimental Criminology* 1(2): 191-213; Sherman, Lawrence W. (2003). “Experimental Evidence and Governmental Administration.” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 589, No. 1, 226-233; Weisburd, David, Cynthia Lum and Sue-Ming Yang (2003). “When Can We Conclude that Treatments or Programs ‘Don’t Work?’” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 587:31-48.

11 Secondary intermediaries are those whose involvement in the sex trade is not their primary form of employment. In the majority of cases, the secondary intermediary was a cab driver. Other intermediaries solicited during the three waves of the study included a McDonald’s server, street vendors, a club security guard, a private street driver, a restaurant owner, and a hotel server. In some instances, primary intermediaries with more direct involvement in the sex trade (like pimps, brothel owners, or Mamasans) helped steer our investigators to establishments, but this was rare.

by which sex tourists gain access to prostituted or commercially exploited persons in Cebu. During waves 1 and 2, our investigators did not encounter taxi drivers who were unwilling or unable to direct them to a location where they could gain access to sex in exchange for money. During wave 3, the majority of taxi drivers were still willing to assist us in our efforts to meet young girls. However, there were a handful of isolated instances when cab drivers were unwilling to provide assistance. In one episode, our investigator asked the cab driver to pull over so he could give some pocket change to a little girl walking on the side of the road wearing tattered clothing. The driver refused to stop and appeared very angry. Our interpretation was that he viewed us as sex tourists looking to connect with the little girl. In another episode, a driver asked our investigators to leave his vehicle when they began asking him about where they could find young girls. In addition, taxi drivers in wave 3 seemed less knowledgeable about where to take us. Once we refused their offers to take us to the same high-priced establishments where they typically take foreigners, the search for alternative places was more difficult in wave 3 than in previous waves.

Despite these subtle differences between wave 3 and the earlier waves, it is still very much the case that taxi drivers serve as the primary intermediaries for connecting sex tourists with people and places who provide sexual services for hire. It was clear throughout all three waves of the study that taxi drivers receive some sort of inducement from certain bars or brothels (typically high-end establishments) to direct sex tourists there. In all three zones, once we had already visited these “hot spots,” it became increasingly difficult to find new locations. Some cab drivers claimed that they did not know about other spots, while other drivers seemed quite content to allow us to hire them for the evening to escort us to establishments of varying types, sizes, and price ranges. Our investigators continued hiring new intermediaries each evening, quickly letting go of those who were unable to assist them in finding new locations.

Investigators informed the intermediaries that they were looking for “younger girls” or some other similarly descriptive yet vague language.¹² Once the intermediary identified an establishment within the team’s zone (Lapu Lapu, Mandaue City, or Cebu City), the team then visited that establishment. If the team had already visited the establishment, they encouraged the intermediary to recommend a different establishment. Once the team visited the establishment recommended by the intermediary, they took one of two courses of action. If there were other bars or brothels in the immediate area (within a five minute walk), the team simply went to those locations next. Several areas contained concentrations of bars with prostituted or commercially exploited persons, and this method allowed for the possibility of visiting every establishment within a concentrated area. If there were not other

12 CJA investigators were counseled by IJM attorneys in the Philippines not to say they were looking for “minors” because soliciting minors for sex is a criminal offense.

bars or brothels in the area, the team would approach an intermediary (either the same one or a different one) and begin the process again.¹³

We anticipated that we would visit all bars and brothels in Lapu Lapu and Mandaue City using this method, including those visited during the baseline and wave 2 studies and any new establishments, because the total number of establishments there was suspected to be manageable. In Cebu City, we anticipated that we would only be able to visit a sample of the establishments since we would not have enough personnel or be in the field long enough to visit them all. Our plan was to continue the process of asking intermediaries to recommend new locations until we ran out of time. Based on our results from the wave 1 and wave 2 studies, we anticipated that this approach would produce a sample of approximately 75 bars and brothels. In the end, we made 114 visits to 68 bars and 7 visits to 5 brothels. Our impression is that we exhausted all or most establishments in Lapu Lapu and Mandaue City since we reached a saturation point in both locations where repeated attempts to discover establishments we had not previously visited were unsuccessful. We suspect that we did not visit all establishments in Cebu City, though by the final day of the study we experienced significant difficulty finding establishments we had not previously visited. One or two additional days would probably have exhausted the Cebu City establishments (not including whatever brothels remain in operation in Kamagayan). In the end we visited 23 bars and 3 brothels in Lapu Lapu, 13 bars and 0 brothels in Mandaue City, and 32 bars and 2 brothels in Cebu City. We hypothesize that the relative difficulty we faced in finding minors in both waves 2 and 3 (compared with wave 1) brought us to fewer establishments than in wave 1. This was especially the case with regard to brothels.

2. Sampling Massage Parlors

In seeking out massage parlors where patrons can receive sexual services from a masseuse who is a minor, we followed a process very similar to the one we used for bars and brothels. Each team was required to approach an intermediary about finding a good location for a massage from a young girl who also provides sexual services. We made 8 visits to 8 massage parlors, including 0 in Lapu Lapu, 1 in Mandaue City, and 7 in Cebu City.

13 In some cases, teams would hire a taxi driver for the night, so that when they left an establishment, the cab driver was waiting outside ready to recommend another establishment and transport them there. The teams made the decision about whether to hire a taxi driver for a whole night on a case-by-case basis. In some cases, for instance, safety considerations led the team to want a cab waiting outside in case of a security concern. In other cases, such as when visiting brothels, it made sense to hire different cab drivers for visits to different brothels so the drivers would not become suspicious about why our investigators were repeatedly choosing not to hire a girl.

3. Sampling Freelancers

We were informed by local experts in sex trafficking and prostitution that the Cebu metropolitan area is also home to a number of prostituted persons who do not work in an establishment like a bar, a brothel, or a massage parlor. Our research suggests that freelancers work primarily in the malls and on the streets. To examine the extent to which freelancers are available in the malls, we assigned each investigative team to walk through shopping malls separately to pose as sex tourists. We waited for prostituted women or their representatives to make some form of contact with us. Our preparatory research from the baseline study suggested that the prime time is from 4 p.m. to 8 p.m. Our investigators made 12 attempts in malls by walking from one end to the other for at least one hour attempting to make eye contact with people thought to be prostituted; these included:

- 4 visits to Ayala Mall in Cebu City
- 1 visit to Gaisano Country Mall in Cebu City
- 1 visit to Gaisano Grand Mall in Lapu Lapu
- 2 visits to IT Park in Cebu City
- 1 visit to Marina Mall in Lapu Lapu
- 1 visit to Park Mall in Mandaue City
- 2 visits to SM City Mall in Cebu City

In designing our sampling strategy at the outset of this study, we found it difficult to establish a formal strategy for sampling freelancers who work the streets either independently or using the services of a pimp. Instead we relied on a convenience sample of prostituted women whom we encountered during our time in the Cebu area. During our first trip to Cebu in 2006, our two-person advance team just happened to meet six of them walking together, including one confirmed minor and one suspected minor. During wave 2 our investigators met 16 different sex workers through mall walks and street encounters. All investigators were instructed to pay attention to the possibility that freelancers may be found in some outside locations and to engage them whenever possible. By the end of wave 3, we had met 3 sex workers in malls and 92 on the streets either working with a pimp or by themselves. Although we originally conceived of freelancers and those working with pimps as mutually exclusive, we discovered during wave 3 that these categories tend to overlap in practice. For instance, one of our investigators met a freelancer on the street one night and brought her to a karaoke bar as part of his age confirmation procedures. The next night when he was in a taxi in a different part of town, he stopped to talk to a pimp, and this same young lady was working for the pimp. We saw numerous other examples in which young ladies floated across sex worker categories from working as a bikini bar dancer, to freelancing, to working in a brothel or with a pimp.

4. Sampling Escorts

Throughout the geographic region we studied, our team witnessed advertisements with phone numbers for numerous escort and outcall massage services in tabloid newspapers, magazines, and telephone books. These services represented a possible alternate means of accessing underage sex workers. While not initially part of our sampling strategy, we conducted brief side studies of escort services during the first two waves. In both cases, we assigned a field investigator to check into a low-cost “operations hotel” (as differentiated from the actual hotel where they were staying) to call escort services. In wave 1, one of our investigators eventually met a minor using this method, but it was a time-consuming and inefficient process. In wave 2, our investigator ended up having conversations with staff at 6 locations, only one of which claimed to have minors available. Six other locations either failed to return calls or had disconnected phone numbers. We were too busy in the field during wave 3 to assign an investigator to examine escort services. Based on findings from waves 1 and 2, we don’t view telephone escort services as a primary avenue through which sex tourists gain access to minors.

Balancing Efficiency and Reliability in Sampling

During the wave 1 study, part of the rationale for the sampling strategy we selected was that we did not have access to a list of establishments offering prostituted or sexually exploited women and girls. By the time of the wave 2 study, IJM had amassed such a list. Thus a reasonable question was whether we would use the list in waves 2 and 3. If the list had been available at wave 1, we may have chosen to incorporate it into our overall sampling strategy. But since it was not available at wave 1, using it during subsequent waves would have represented a substantial change in methodology. It may have been less *efficient* at waves 2 and 3 to proceed without using (or even seeing) the list, but it was essential to the integrity of the study. Longitudinal research methods must rely on the same data collection methods over time for the resulting findings to be considered reliable, even at the cost of efficiency.

Units of Analysis

In the jargon of social scientists, this study has three primary “units of analysis:” global attempts, sub-attempts, and establishments. We will begin by explaining the two different kinds of attempts.

Attempts

When our investigators set out to locate a minor, they were initiating what we called an attempt. Because IJM asked us to track the elapsed time it took to find a minor, we divided attempts into two nested types: “global attempts” and “sub-attempts.” A global attempt always contained one or more associated sub-attempts. At the start of the study, each investigator initiated his first global attempt. If he visited two bars without finding a minor and then located a minor at a third bar, then the global attempt consisted of three sub-attempts, two unsuccessful and one successful. Once a minor was

located, resuming the search for additional minors meant the start of a new global attempt. Global attempts ended in only two ways: the investigator (or the team) located a minor, or the command center issued a request to cease the global attempt for administrative reasons (either because the zone was complete, or because the study was over). Sub-attempts ended when the investigator reached some resolution about the presence of minors, either locating one, generating a promise for one, or failing to locate one and therefore needing to visit a new location or establishment. Let us provide a hypothetical example of global attempts and sub-attempts.

Suppose at the beginning of the study, Team 1 left their operations hotel at 2100 to visit a brothel for the first time. They would call in their departure time to the command center signaling the launch of a new global attempt. Their visit to the brothel would also signal the beginning of the first sub-attempt within that global attempt. Suppose they went to the brothel and discovered that there were a number of prostituted or commercially exploited persons available but none of them were minors. Upon their exit, they would notify the command center of their departure time as well as other information about the brothel. Their failure to locate a minor would mean the end of the first sub-attempt, but their global attempt would continue. Upon their arrival at another establishment recommended by their cab driver (say a KTV bar), they would call in their arrival time and other descriptive information to the command center. This would launch sub-attempt 2 within global attempt 1. Suppose they locate a minor at the KTV bar. Once they achieved some form of age confirmation, they would exit the establishment, call in their findings to the command center, and that would signal the end of global attempt 1, as well as the second sub-attempt within that global attempt. Once the investigators visited the next establishment, they would be opening up the first sub-attempt within a new global attempt. Dividing attempts into global attempts and sub-attempts is what allowed us to track the various kinds of indicators or proxies selected at the methodology workshop and record those measurements in databases that could be analyzed systematically.

During each sub-attempt and each global attempt, we recorded the elapsed time from the start of our search for a minor until we were able to meet one (or more) in person. Using the sub-attempt and global attempt approach, we recorded the characteristics of both unsuccessful attempts and successful attempts. These characteristics included the date and time of the attempt, the facilitator with whom the attempt was made, the steps taken by the facilitator to locate a minor, the excuses offered by the facilitator about why a minor was not available (if applicable), the duration of the attempt, and the price for having sex if the attempt was successful.

Establishments

The third unit of analysis in this study was the establishment. We systematically recorded the characteristics of each establishment we visited. What type of establishment was it? What was the nature of its security arrangements? How many minors were we able to locate there and at what cost?

Summary

The units of analysis we have described —global attempts, sub-attempts, and establishments— are all represented in a master database that serves as the primary data source for this report. In addition, this report relies heavily on the written field notes recorded by each team after their observations in the field.

Data Collection

Data collection took place within three zones in the greater Cebu metropolitan area: Lapu Lapu, Mandaue City, and Cebu City. All investigators carried cell phones displaying the current time, therefore enabling them to track the timing of various events. The cell phones all had text messaging capability, voice recorders, and cameras. The investigators adopted various methods for retaining and recording the information they collected in the field. Some recorded their information on voice recorders attached to their cell phones; some took written notes surreptitiously in bathroom stalls or in the back seats of taxi cabs; some did regular “data dumps” to the command center via text message; some sent text messages to themselves as a way of recalling the information they observed; some called in their data to the command center over the telephone. The wide variation in the environments in which our investigators made their observations made it difficult to adopt a single standard—we allowed our investigators the freedom to record and transmit the necessary information to the command center in ways that made sense for them and their environment. For instance, while it was easy for our investigators to step outside a KTV bar and call in their data to the command center over the telephone, this same approach would have appeared suspicious to the brothel keepers in some of the brothels we visited in isolated areas. Once the data were transmitted to the command center (in whatever format), the data were entered into databases maintained by our data manager on a laptop computer.

All investigators were also instructed to prepare written field notes at the conclusion of their observations. A common pattern was for investigative teams to return to the hotel, debrief with one another about their observations until the wee hours of the morning, and then work on their field notes together. Often fatigue interfered with this process, so teams would return to their field notes the next day. Every team completed written field notes and these constitute an important resource for understanding what they observed in the field.

Our data were collected primarily from passive observations of phenomena in the field, as well as conversations with a variety of people associated with commercial sexual exploitation. Our investigators used a series of scripts during their conversations with intermediaries and sex workers. Some of these were “canned” scripts that we had established beforehand in concert with IJM investigators with significant experience in conducting similar observations both in the Philippines and in other sex tourism destinations. Other scripts were improvised in the field to fit the dynamic circumstances we encountered. Initially CJA had considered using only canned scripts as a means of ensuring reliability across waves of data collection, but IJM investigators (wisely) advised against adopting this approach. As any good cop knows, the ability to improvise based on the circumstances is crucial for gathering information. Our investigators relied primarily on three kinds of scripts: entrance scripts, midstream scripts, and exit scripts. Entrance scripts were used to communicate our wishes to secondary intermediaries and to locate establishments where minor sex trafficking victims could be found. Midstream scripts were our “cover stories” used to secure the trust and confidence of prostituted persons and intermediaries. Exit scripts were used as our excuses for leaving an establishment, not hiring a prostituted person, or not completing a sexual transaction. Within each category, we allowed our investigators considerable leeway to choose canned scripts or invent others that they viewed as most appropriate for a given situation.

V. AGE ESTIMATION

The reliability and validity of our measurement strategy rests largely on our procedures for determining who was a minor and who was an adult. In this section, we briefly discuss the scientific foundations of age estimation, the findings of the age estimation training exercises we conducted in waves 1 and 2, and a brief description of the age estimation training used in this study.

Scientific Foundations of Age Estimation

Our wave 1 baseline report reviewed the current (at the time) state of scientific knowledge on visible characteristics of aging. This review examined the accuracy of several age estimation methods, including the “Tanner stages” of physical development in children and adolescents,¹⁴ dental and skeletal examinations, and biometric technologies. Our review of the evidence at the time of the wave 1 study concluded that existing age estimation methods were both inaccurate and unsuitable for use in the field during a data collection exercise or investigation.

Since our review of the evidence in 2006, considerable advances have been made in biometric technologies of many types. Yet even with these advances, our basic conclusion in 2006 that age estimation biometrics were not sufficiently valid or reliable still holds true today. For instance, a recent study concluded that “current age estimation performance is still not good enough for practical use.”¹⁵ While research continues on biometric technologies that can be used to estimate ages, we are not aware of any that can outperform simple human judgment. Much of this is because individuals age differently, depending on a number of factors including gender, ethnicity/race, health conditions, lifestyle choices, and geographic location.¹⁶ As a result, using biometric or computer based technologies to decipher the effects of these external factors on the aging process has been met with significant difficulty. However, even if reliable age-estimation biometric technologies were available, they are impractical for use in an undercover setting where the investigator is posing as a sex tourist.

The reason we have reviewed these various scientific methods and technologies for estimating ages is to demonstrate that there are no “industry standards” for estimating the chronological age of unknown individuals. The methods that are available have mostly been tested on Caucasian and African-American

14 Tanner, James M. (1962). *Growth at Adolescence* (2nd edition). Oxford: Blackwell.

15 Guodong, Guo, Yun Fu, Charles R. Dyer, and Thomas S. Huang (2008). “Image-Based Human Age Estimation by Manifold Learning and Locally Adjusted Robust Regression.” *IEEE Transactions on Image Processing* 17(7): 1178.

16 Lanitis, Andreas. (2009). “Facial Biometric Templates and Aging: Problems and Challenges for Artificial Intelligence.” *Artificial Intelligence Applications and Innovations Workshops 2009*: 142-149.

populations and have unknown reliability and validity properties for Asians. In addition, they are impractical for use in an investigative setting. Because we were unable to rely on well-established field methods or technologies to help us estimate ages, it was necessary to rely on alternative methods.

Age Estimation Exercise

During the first two waves of the study, CJA team members participated in age estimation exercises prior to entering the field. These exercises helped to refine the ability of CJA investigators to identify underage females using only visual cues. Because our original age estimation exercise was cancelled with little notice, IJM's Manila office was kind enough to arrange an age estimation training exercise on May 20, 2010. During this exercise, CJA staff were shown numerous photographs of young women as part of a PowerPoint presentation. This was followed by a helpful discussion with IJM staff about useful visual cues to use in estimating a person's age. In the absence of a full age-estimation exercise like we conducted during waves 1 and 2, this training exercise was useful, both as a refresher for the seven investigators who had participated during previous waves of the study, and as an introduction for the one investigator new to the team during wave 3.

Review of Previous Age Estimation Studies

During previous waves, CJA team members conducted age estimation exercises at Marillac Hills and the Haven, a home for abused or abandoned girls and women. CJA team members and IJM investigators participated in these exercise as "coders," guessing the ages of girls and women whose ages are known. One hundred girls and women ranging in age from 9 to 46 (with a mean age of 18.2) participated in the exercise as research subjects during wave 2.

During the first two waves, team members sat behind two lines of long tables in a room at the Haven, while the girls and women were led into the room, fully clothed, one at a time. Girls were presented in no particular order, based only on the pseudo-random method by which they queued up. Each participant spent approximately 20 to 30 seconds in front of the team members, as a facilitator asked them to smile, so their teeth could be inspected as well as their face and body. Once each participant left the room, the team members spent a few seconds estimating her age and recording it onto sheets which were later entered into a database. Subsequently, a facilitator called out the true age of the participant. During waves 1 and 2 of this exercise, CJA and IJM team members refined their abilities for picking out age cues and signals with each woman or girl they assessed. Participants also found it useful to confer with each other to share their own methods for estimating ages accurately. This collaboration proved useful.

It might seem reasonable to conclude that the environment in which our age estimations would take place in the field was equally (or perhaps more) distracting than the age estimation training exercises.

However, field teams benefited from the presence of two circumstances that were not available during the training sessions. First, investigative teams in the field were almost always able to confer privately about their age estimates as part of the confirmation process. Second, field teams benefited from being able to spend much longer than 20-30 seconds talking to and observing most of the subjects they attempted to confirm. Even when suspected minors were present but unavailable for some reason, we still attempted to spend time with them whenever possible. For instance, much to the chagrin of other male customers, in some cases our investigative teams “borrowed” or “stole” suspected minors away from other customers to engage in a confirmation process with them (in spite of the obvious safety risk this practice entailed). We believe the conditions in the field were much more conducive to accurate confirmations than conditions in the age estimation exercise. Nonetheless, the exercises used during all three waves were very useful for enabling both the IJM and CJA teams to observe the physical characteristics that seem to be associated with age and minor versus adult status.¹⁷

Age Confirmation Procedures

The research on age estimation in a clinical setting suggests that the best approach is a dental x-ray to measure dental age, an x-ray of the left hand to measure bone or skeletal age, and a thorough exam by a physician familiar with the age group being studied. Obviously these clinical methods are not feasible in a field study like this one. We investigated the possible use of passive biometric technologies that could be used in the field but were unable to locate any with a sufficient scientific basis. Because there are not currently any clearly reliable methods for estimating age in a field setting (as opposed to a clinical setting), we chose to rely first and foremost on the judgment of our investigators. The age verification exercises we conducted during waves 1 and 2 established some of the parameters for determining the accuracy of our estimates.¹⁸ The estimation exercises were only simulations, of course.

17 After the wave 2 study, IJM reviewers asked CJA to examine the relationship between investigator performance during the age verification exercise and later productivity in confirming minors during the field observations. We used two measures of performance during the age estimation exercise: the mean square error in raw age estimations, and the proportion of correct guesses about minor status. Productivity in confirming minors was measured using the number of successful subattempts in which the investigator participated. We examined three types of correlations, one parametric (Pearson's r) and two non-parametric (Spearman's ρ and Kendall's τ). Of the six resulting correlation coefficients, none were significant. Performance in the age estimation exercise was unrelated to productivity in the field.

18 During each wave we attempted to gather information from CJA and IJM participants in the age estimation exercises about how they made their judgments. We found that there was not a clearly defined set of physical features or cues that people used in developing their age estimates. Most had difficulty describing their decision making process in detail. They described it as having emerged quickly based on a totality of the circumstances. The process appeared to resemble what people normally think of as intuition but what Malcolm Gladwell has more recently described as “rapid cognition.” See M. Gladwell (2006). *Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking*. London: Penguin.

In some ways they provided advantages we did not have in the field (such as good lighting and clothing chosen by the participants),¹⁹ while in other ways it was easier to estimate ages in the field.²⁰

Our age verification procedure was based on the idea of multiple forms of confirmation. Our investigative teams used a combination of their scripts and their judgment to estimate the number of minors in an establishment or other settings. The first method was simply visual observation—investigative partners would routinely observe all of the commercially exploited persons in an establishment or other setting and each arrive at an independent estimate of the number of minors, discussing any discrepancies and usually hatching a quick plan for confirming their suspicions.

During all three waves, our investigators were unanimous in their assessment, based on their experiences in the field, that minors are coached to lie about their ages. Typically this took the form of minors claiming they were 18 or older. However, as minors became less available in waves 2 and 3, we began to see lying in the opposite direction, with pimps trying to pass off adults as minors. Overall, our impressions are that people lied the least during wave 1, more during wave 2, and the most during wave 3. We attribute this pattern to two factors. First, during wave 1, minors were omnipresent, so it was not necessary to create a false supply of minors (by trying to pass off adults as minors) to meet our demand. Second, there was less fear of arrest and prosecution, so it was not as necessary for actual minors to pretend they were adults. Thus the degree of dishonesty about age seems to be directly related to the supply of actual minors and the fear of arrest and prosecution. By wave 2, the supply had decreased and the fear had increased, so we saw greater dishonesty. By wave 3, the supply had decreased further and we saw evidence that fear had increased as well, so dishonesty peaked in wave 3.²¹

19 The lighting in the field was often suboptimal, either because our investigators were in dark bars or outside locations at night. Participants in the exercises wore their own clothing which sometimes contained clues about their age (for instance, a picture of a teddy bear on a girl's shirt might indicate that she is younger than she looks). While some girls in the field wore their own clothing, many of them wore outfits or costumes selected by bar staff.

20 Three factors presumably made it easier to estimate a girl's age in the field through observations alone. First, our investigators were able to view girls in the field in person, while they were limited to only photographs during the wave 3 age estimation exercise. Second, the girls in the field often wore much less clothing, making it easier to view body parts that might provide indications of their age. Third, investigators in the field were often able to engage underage suspects and their colleagues in conversation helping to establish whether their initial visual assessment was correct.

21 More detailed information on dishonesty about age and our methods for detecting it is available from IJM.

In most establishments, our investigators would each talk to at least one person privately to ensure a minimum of two additional data points, often talking to more than one person each. The goal was for the investigators to have several pieces of information available to them during their deliberations about the number of minors they observed: information from their own separate observations, information from a primary intermediary (Mamasan²², brothel owner, or pimp), and information from multiple prostituted persons in an establishment. In most instances, these multiple forms of confirmation were sufficient for reaching a common estimate of the number of minors. In those cases where the primary investigative team was either unable to gather the necessary information, or they gathered conflicting information, the command center sent another team in to do a revisit. IJM also provided CJA with hidden video recording equipment in waves 1 and 2 so we could capture video images of girls or locations where we were unable to resolve questions about minor status. Our thinking was that these images could be viewed later by a forensic anthropologist or a pediatrician specializing in Filipina girls specifically or Asian girls more generally. Although we used the camera to capture dozens of video images, in the end we did not need the footage for verification since we were able to use our routine verification methods in nearly every case. Thus we chose not to use the hidden video cameras in wave 3. Our approach of generating multiple points of confirmation usually provided us with sufficient information to make informed judgments about age.

22 A “Mamasan” is a woman who is in charge of the prostituted or commercially exploited girls. She typically provides their housing and food, schedules their work, and disciplines them. We spoke with dozens of Mamasans and we also spoke with the girls about their Mamasans. In most instances, the girls told us the Mamasan is a good resource for them, providing them with food and shelter. In some instances, the girls clearly feared the Mamasan and viewed her as mean, unfair, or ruthless.

VI. WAVE 3 FINDINGS

The primary focus of each wave of the study was to collect data on eight indicators selected by IJM as proxies for the availability of child sex trafficking victims. This section reviews findings on each of these eight indicators during wave 3. Summary data on these indicators can be found in Appendix 2 (summary of data on establishments) and Appendix 3 (summary of data on attempts).

Indicator 1: Number of children trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation found in target area

There were a total of 18 minor trafficking victims found in establishments and 3 found not in establishments (for a total of 21).²³ Our investigators discovered minors in 10 establishments; we made a total of 13 visits (including revisits to some establishments) to the 10 establishments where a total of 18 minors were discovered. Overall, we found 1,369 commercial sex workers, of which 1,082 were in establishments and 287 were in non-establishments. Thus, 1.7% of sex workers found in establishments were confirmed minors, and 1.5% of the total number of sex workers found were minors.

Indicator 2: Elapsed time to locate a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation

Of the 15 global attempts ending successfully, the total time to find a minor (which includes the total number of minutes in each of the sub-attempts for that global attempt) was 6,740 minutes (112.3 hours). That is an average of 449.3 minutes per attempt (approximately 7 hours and 29 minutes), with a minimum of 81 minutes and a maximum of 1,390 minutes.²⁴ We were not able to detect any temporal patterns in these elapsed times within wave 3 (i.e., there were no significant changes in elapsed times as the wave 3 study progressed).

23 One of the concerns typically raised in studies like this one is double-counting. While we cannot be certain that there was not some double counting, we have two reasons to believe it unlikely. First, the four investigative teams were assigned to three zones. Although the teams sometimes covered the same zone, their movements were coordinated closely by the command center. Command center staff would likely have detected double counting if it occurred. Second, the teams were in regular contact with one another, sharing the details of their work nearly every day. If we were counting the same people, we believe it would have become evident during these meetings and telephone conversations. Although we cannot guarantee there was no double counting, we believe there were sufficient safeguards in place to minimize it.

24 Note that the total amount of time for all 174 sub-attempts was 9,289 minutes (154.8 hours), however this includes global attempts that were terminated without success (for example, time ran out without finding a minor). Note also that there are two possible ways of interpreting the time of a global attempt. One way would be to begin the clock at the start of the first sub-attempt and compute the hours transpiring until successfully finding a minor. The problem with this approach is that between sub-attempts, there was much time spent not attempting to find a minor (e.g., sleeping, team meetings, traveling from location to location, etc.). For this reason, we decided to operationalize total time to find a minor as comprising the total time in each sub-attempt leading up to a successful attempt.

Indicator 3: Number of attempts to locate a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation

Of the 174 sub-attempts in this study, 15 (8.6%) of them ended successfully when one of our investigators located a minor sex trafficking victim in person. Thus, the average number of attempts to locate a minor sex trafficking victim before meeting one (or more) in person was 11.6. Within the 174 total sub-attempts made by the team, our investigators were promised a total of 14 minors.

Indicator 4: Number of establishments offering a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation

The total number of “establishments” (including bars, brothels, and massage parlors) that we visited was 81. Of these, 1 promised to provide us with a minor and 10 had confirmed minors. A total of 10 either promised minors or had confirmed minors. Of the 18 total confirmed minors found in establishments, all were found in bars; none were found in brothels or massage parlors.

Indicator 5: Number of people not affiliated with commercial sex establishments offering a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation

Six pimps not affiliated with establishments made promises of 9 minors.²⁵ No taxi drivers promised or provided minors directly. When taxi drivers were involved in supplying minor sex workers, they operated as secondary intermediaries who went through either pimps or establishments.

Indicator 6: Price charged for purchasing the services of a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation

There were a total of 16 sets of minors (one or more, with the same price attached to each) located, and of these, pricing information was available for 12. For some, particularly those operating in the most distressed areas and offering the most weathered looking girls, the price was simply described as “negotiable.” Price is measured as maximum (“bar fine” plus girl), although in some cases the price is

25 During preparation of the wave 1 report, IJM asked whether we could produce an estimate of the percentage of the total number of unaffiliated persons who offered minors out the total unaffiliated persons we approached. Because we did not plan to produce such an estimate, it would be difficult to do so with any degree of precision. In some environments, such as in the back seat of a taxi cab or standing outside a club located in a safe area, it was easy to capture and record data. However, many of our conversations with primary and secondary intermediaries, particularly those that took place outdoors in distressed areas like Kamagayan, occurred in a chaotic, potentially dangerous environment in which our investigators were surrounded by pimps, street hustlers, and assorted other characters. It was difficult in such an environment to capture and record data in a way that did not jeopardize our safety. Our data collection protocol required our investigators to commit several facts to short term memory until it was safe to transmit those facts to the command center. This made it difficult to record data systematically that were not on our data collection protocol, though we attempted to do so in our field notes.

missing a negotiable extra fee or tip for the girl.²⁶ The minimum was P700, the maximum was P5000, and the average was P2492. The nature of the service that a customer could expect varied somewhat across these transactions. Typically, however, the price included taking the girl away for the whole night and performing manual sex acts and intercourse. Some of the prices were for “short time” only (2-3 hours), but the typical responses to our investigators’ questions about how long they could keep the girl were “it’s up to you” or “whatever you want.” These responses were typically accompanied by a nonchalant shrug of the shoulders, suggesting that customers could keep the girls for as much time as they preferred. Oral sex was typically described as being solely at the discretion of the girl; some girls claimed to be skilled at it and used it as a selling point. Nearly everybody we spoke with was adamant that anal sex was out of the question.²⁷ We did not systematically record prices for what the locals referred to as “short time” transactions (taking the girl away for approximately two or three hours). We also did not systematically record prices for hiring girls to sit with us in private VIP rooms in bars. In higher class establishments, renting a VIP room was typically a moneymaking scheme for both the girl and the bar; sexual services were not routinely offered to customers in those settings.

In lower class establishments, renting a private room did tend to come with the expectation of sexual services. For example, during the wave 1 study, our investigator paid to bring a girl into a private room (essentially a small, dark, dirty closet). Once inside, the girl immediately attempted to perform oral sex on him. The nature of this transaction suggested that customers who rented a private room at this bar could routinely expect oral sex. One of our investigators in the wave 3 study was led to a location upstairs above a bar where sex was offered. During wave 3, another investigator (while visiting a bar that replaced one closed down by IJM after the wave 2 study) was offered oral sex in a chair near the entrance to the bar; people coming into the bar would easily have been able to observe this activity had he accepted.

26 A bar fine is the price for removing a prostituted girl from a bar. We were quoted prices using two different types of bar fines: one type in which the money paid to the bar is split with the girl, and another type in which the money paid to the bar is for the bar only and the customer needs to negotiate the remainder of the price with the girl. In both cases, tipping is expected on top of the bar fine.

27 We did not systematically track prices for “short time” sexual encounters or for specific sex acts. We systematically tracked prices for the modal type of sexual transaction in the Cebu area, which involved taking a girl away for the whole night and having manual sexual contact and/or intercourse with her. Depending on the personal preferences or style of the girl, this transaction may or may not include oral sex. Our understanding is that girls would typically provide oral sex as part of their efforts to secure a larger gratuity from the customer, but this is just our collective impression based on our conversations with the girls, not the result of systematic data collection and analysis.

Indicator 7: Percent of total attempts to procure a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation that results in the presumed facilitator, victim, or prostituted or commercially exploited adult citing the police/law enforcement as the reason why a minor is unavailable

Data on mentions of laws or law enforcement is available for 121 attempts. Of those 121 cases, 8.6% of intermediaries mentioned law enforcement, 6.3% mentioned laws, 5.7% of sex workers mentioned law enforcement, and 5.7% of sex workers mentioned laws. During the wave 2 study, one of our investigators asked a sex worker at a bar about finding younger girls. She acted surprised and answered, “Huh, *Echegaray!*” Leo Echegaray was the first man given the death penalty in the Philippines for raping a minor.²⁸ During wave 3, each of our investigative teams reported increased instances of intermediaries and sex workers referencing law enforcement and the illegal nature of procuring underage females. On numerous occasions these individuals would respond to requests for minors by placing their hands out in front, fists up and wrists together, to emulate being handcuffed. We coded this gesture as a mention of law enforcement even if it was not accompanied by a matching verbal response. Also in wave 3, our investigators reported noting a handful of establishments with signs indicating that bar fines are illegal. These signs were clearly symbolic, since we also sometimes observed young women negotiating bar fines just a few feet away from the signs.

Indicator 8: Incidence/type of security measures at establishments

Our investigators visited 81 different establishments; because some were visited multiple times, we made a total of 129 visits to establishments. The following distributions of security arrangements are based on number of visits, not number of establishment, since an establishment may have varying security measures on different visits. During these visits, there was an average of 1.01 doormen per establishment, including approximately 33% with no doormen, 54% with one, 10% with two, and 2% with three or more. On average, only .33 doormen armed with a firearm were observed per establishment, including approximately 73% with no armed doormen, 22% with one, 4% with two, and 1% with three or more. During wave 3, we observed some doormen wearing empty holsters but keeping their firearms hidden nearby. They told us they were trying to keep their firearms hidden from drunken customers who might try to take the gun away from them. Several of them told us they had never fired their weapon before. Generally, the doormen did not appear to be skilled or trained in the use of their weapons and would openly discuss where the firearm was hidden. One tried to hand his hidden firearm to our investigator. Consistent with the findings from wave 2 (which showed that investigators were rarely frisked), our investigators were only frisked or patted down once in wave 3. Similarly, they were only searched electronically (with a handheld metal detector) once.

28 See: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/272980.stm>

VII. WAVE 1, 2, AND 3 COMPARISONS

So far in this report, we have discussed the context of the wave 1 and 2 studies and presented a variety of quantitative results on eight indicators of sexual trafficking of minors in the Cebu metropolitan area for wave 3. In this section we present comparisons of findings across all three waves of the study. Appendix 2 (summary of data on establishments data) and Appendix 3 (summary of data on attempts) provide tabular results of findings from each wave.

Indicator 1: Number of children trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation found in target area

CJA investigators located 103 minors in wave 1, 29 in wave 2, and 21 in wave 3. During the wave 1 study, CJA investigators made 84 visits to bars, 12 visits to brothels, 19 visits to massage parlors, and 16 visits (walk-throughs) to malls. During wave 2, they made 88 visits to bars, 4 visits to brothels, 10 visits to massage parlors, and 8 visits to malls.²⁹ In wave 3, they made 114 visits to bars, 7 visits to brothels, 8 visits to massage parlors and 12 visits to malls. Across the board, whether by zone or establishment type, the number of minors decreased dramatically from wave 1 to wave 2, and decreased again from wave 2 to wave 3.

Of all the minors found in wave 1, 85.4% were located in an establishment (a bar, brothel, or massage parlor), compared to 69.0% in wave 2, and 85.7% in wave 3. Of the total number of sex workers found in establishments, 6.6% in wave 1 were confirmed as minors, compared to 1.6% in wave 2 and 1.7% in wave 3. Thirty five establishments employed minors in wave 1, compared to 15 in wave 2, and 10 in wave 3. All of these numbers suggest a decrease in the number of available minors in bars, brothels, and massage parlors.

Indicator 2: Elapsed time to locate a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation

CJA investigators ended 53 global attempts successfully in wave 1, compared with only 24 in wave 2, and 15 in wave 3. In wave 1 it took investigators approximately 1 hour and 50 minutes per attempt to find a minor, compared to 5 hours and 15 minutes in wave 2, and 7 hours and 29 minutes in wave 3. In all three waves, we found no significant changes in elapsed time from the beginning to the end of the study period.

29 It might be tempting to view the decrease in the number of visits or in the number of establishments visited as the reason we found fewer minors. However, the causal order in this argument is backwards. During wave 2, we spent much more time chasing false leads, working our way through various attempts by intermediaries to pass off adults as minors (a case of supply –albeit counterfeit or false supply– rising to meet demand), and failing in our efforts to find minors. The total time spent in the field, including all global attempts, was greater in wave 2 than in wave 1.

Indicator 3: Number of attempts to locate a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation

During wave 1, 33.3% of sub-attempts ended successfully when one of our investigators located a minor sex trafficking victim, compared to 20.7% of attempts in wave 2, and 8.6% of attempts in wave 3. Because minors were located with less frequency in waves 2 and 3, the average number of sub-attempts before finding a minor increased from 2.57 in wave 1 to 4.04 in wave 2 and 8.6 in wave 3. Minors were also promised more often in wave 1 (56 promised) than in waves 2 (22 promised) and 3 (14 promised).

Indicator 4: Number of establishments offering a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation

In wave 1, 19.1% of establishments promised minors and 37.2% had confirmed minors. In wave 2, 11.0% of establishments promised minors and 18.3% had confirmed minors. During wave 3, 1.2% promised minors and 12.3% had confirmed minors. The number of establishments which either promised minors or had confirmed minors decreased between the waves from 41 in wave 1 to 19 in wave 2 and 10 in wave 3. In wave 1, 88 confirmed minors were found in establishments; 82 of them (93.2%) were found in bars, 6 of them (6.8%) were found in brothels, and none of them were found in massage parlors. During wave 2, 20 confirmed minors were found in establishments; 18 of them (90%) were found in bars, 2 (10%) were found in brothels, and none were found in massage parlors. In wave 3, 18 confirmed minors were found in establishments, all of them in bars; no minors were found in brothels or massage parlors.

Indicator 5: Number of people not affiliated with commercial sex establishments offering a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation

Throughout all three waves of this study, investigators made contact with persons not affiliated with establishments in an effort to locate minors. During wave 1, six people not affiliated with establishments made promises of minors. These included pimps, streetwalkers, and taxi drivers. In wave 2, four pimps not affiliated with establishments made promises of 9 minors. No taxi drivers or streetwalkers promised or provided minors directly in waves 2 or 3, though taxi drivers did serve as secondary intermediaries for pimps and establishments. During wave 3 of the study, seven unaffiliated individuals made promises of minors.³⁰

30 One of these was a dancer at a bar, but the minor she was offering was a friend not affiliated with the bar, and it was clear that this was a “side deal” not connected with her employment at the bar.

Indicator 6: Price charged for purchasing the services of a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation

In wave 1, we found 54 sets of minors (one or more, with the same price attached to each); in wave 2 we found 21 sets, and in wave 3 we found 16 sets. In each wave we measured price as maximum (“bar fine” plus girl), although in some cases the price is missing a negotiable extra fee or tip for the girl. During wave 1 we found the range of prices to be P500-P6000, with an average of P3010. In wave 2 the range was P700—P5500, with an average of P2603. In wave 3 the range was P700-P5000, with an average price of P2492. These prices included taking the girl away for the entire evening. The prices appear to have decreased across waves to some extent, but this decrease may have as much to do with the mix of intermediaries and establishments across waves as with an actual decrease. Our suspicion is that price has not changed significantly. However, it is worth noting that during wave 3, our investigators found it more difficult to obtain information on prices than in previous waves. Many of the female sex workers in the establishments indicated they did not know the price and referred the investigator to the Mamasan, who in several instances indicated there was no bar fine at the establishment as it was not allowed. Our investigators had to work much harder in wave 3 to earn the trust of the sex workers and Mamasans to break past this initial barrier and obtain true prices.

Indicator 7: Percent of total attempts to procure a child trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation that results in the presumed facilitator, victim, or prostituted or commercially exploited adult citing the police/law enforcement as the reason why a minor is unavailable

Of the 159 total attempts to find a minor (sub-attempts) in wave 1, either the prostitute or the intermediary mentioned either laws or law enforcement activities prohibiting or targeting people who have sex with minors in 17.6% of attempts. In wave 2, out of 116 sub-attempts, this number increased to 19.8%. In wave 3, 19.2% of the sub-attempts included some comment or overt gesture referring to laws or law enforcement. One might expect that as fear of arrest and prosecution increased, these numbers might have exhibited a more pronounced increase. The slight change from wave 1 to wave 2 is consistent with this explanation. But why didn’t the increase continue from wave 2 to wave 3? Our interpretation is that we were viewed with much more suspicion after news of IJM’s investigations in Cebu became well known after wave 2. Instead of warning their customers about risk of arrest or prosecution, the prostitutes and intermediaries instead began to use age coaching and deception more regularly. The market was driven more underground.

Our investigators also noted (anecdotally) an increasing level of incredulity over our interest in minors. Thus, even when people did not mention laws or law enforcement explicitly, the collective judgment of the research team was that in wave 2, and even more so in wave 3, people displayed more pronounced reactions (including subtleties like facial expressions, gestures, tones of voice, etc...) than

in wave 1 in response to our interest in finding minors. During wave 3, one of our investigative teams was kicked out of a taxi cab when they requested the driver's assistance in taking them to a location where they could procure minors. This was the first time our team experienced a cab driver who was so overtly unwilling to assist our efforts. We visited a popular local hangout for foreign sex tourists (though apparently not sex tourists seeking minors) and one of them (who claimed to be retired from the U.S. Air Force) said: "Just don't f**k a girl younger than your daughter. And if you're into that, we're gonna kill you anyway." Several of our investigators observed sex workers and intermediaries making handcuff gestures to note their concerns about being associated with underage sex workers. During wave 3, our teams also visited a handful of establishments where workers indicated that previous police raids had caused them to tighten up their operations. Furthermore, during wave 3 our investigators reported noticing a greater presence of law enforcement officers in the field.

Indicator 8: Incidence/type of security measures at establishments taken to guard against police enforcement

CJA investigators made 115 total visits to establishments in wave 1, 102 visits in wave 2, and 129 in wave 3 (each of these figures include revisits). On average, there were 1.17 doormen per establishment in wave 1, compared to .93 in wave 2, and 1.01 in wave 3. On average, only .38 doormen per visit were armed with a firearm in wave 1; this figure increased to .55 in wave 2 and decreased to .33 in wave 3. During wave 1, 2, and 3 of the study investigators were patted down infrequently, at 3, 2, and 1 establishments respectively. While no investigators were searched electronically in wave 1, one investigative team was searched electronically in waves 2 and 3. This comparison across three waves suggests no clear change in the traditional security measures (hiring doormen, arming them, and searching customers) used by establishments.

Overall Comparisons

The results of this study provide clear evidence that the availability of sexually trafficked and commercially exploited minors decreased substantially between the three waves of the study carried out in October 2006 (wave 1), August 2008 (wave 2), and May 2010 (wave 3). Overwhelmingly, investigators in waves 2 and 3 found it much more difficult and time consuming to locate sexually exploited minors than they did during the baseline (wave 1) study. Not only did it take more time and more attempts to locate minors, but in the end, investigators found only about one fifth as many minors in wave 3 as in wave 1. Other patterns were less pronounced or more ambiguous. For instance, although it is typical in both legal and illegal markets for prices to increase when supply decreases, there was not an increase in the prices charged for commercially exploited minors. The prices seem to have decreased slightly, though not enough to infer an actual change. Minors (with the exception of virgins, for whom we were quoted a price by one pimp of 35,000 Pesos during wave 2) appear to be charged out at approximately the same rate as adults.

Between waves 1 and 2 there was a slight increase in the frequency with which laws and law enforcement were mentioned by sex workers or intermediaries when we inquired about finding minors. This was followed by a slight decrease between waves 2 and 3. If news of IJM's raids in concert with local police generated an increase in fear of arrest and prosecution for sex trafficking (which we suspect it did), sex workers and intermediaries did not respond by significantly increasing the extent to which they warned customers of these risks. Instead, they seem to have responded by vastly increasing their use of deception, age coaching, implementing symbolic gestures (like hanging signs noting that bar fines are illegal) and tightening up their procedures. If they suspect a customer might be working with IJM or the police, they simply tell that customer that bar fines are not available in the establishment.

Moreover, our investigators noted a slight shift in the culture surrounding the idea of sex with minors. In previous waves (especially wave 1), our investigators were surprised by the extent to which people (taxi drivers, hotel employees, and even a hair stylist) were willing to direct them to places or people where they could find minors for sex. Even taxi drivers who told us they had daughters seemed to be visibly cooperative in helping us find minors in waves 1 and 2. By wave 3, we started to observe more people reacting incredulously to our requests. We don't want to overstate this point; prostitution, even with minors, still appears to be widely accepted or overlooked in the Cebu area. But by wave 3, we did begin to see evidence that the culture is changing slightly.

One possible explanation for the decrease in availability of sexually trafficked and commercially exploited minors might be that the market has shifted, becoming more covert and available only to those with the knowledge or resources to find what they are looking for. This is a common result when police crack down on illegal commodities or markets. If this is the case, we were unable to find any evidence supporting it. In wave 3 we had one Korean investigator and one Chinese investigator; they both tried hard to find specialized markets aimed at sex tourists from other Asian countries, but were unable to do so. In wave 2, one of our investigative teams encountered a group of Korean sex tourists together with a much larger group of sex workers, but none of them were minors. On internet chat rooms and in conversations with sex tourists at bars or in the mall, we heard about tourism companies bringing Korean and Japanese sex tourists to the area, but our study design was not well suited to investigate this much more private or hidden market. We conclude with some measure of confidence that the publicly available market in sexually trafficked or commercially exploited minors has decreased dramatically from wave 1 to wave 3. We are unable to make any inferences about more private or specialized markets to which we were unable to gain access.

VIII. NOTES ON EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF PROJECT LANTERN

The three waves of measurement undertaken by CJA are useful for evaluating the impact of Project Lantern. But evaluating the effectiveness of programs or policies involves much more than just measurement. Drawing inferences about cause and effect from a multiwave study like this one requires (at least) three additional ingredients. First, the study must measure or control for alternative explanations. For instance, isolating the impact of Project Lantern on the sexual trade in minors in the Cebu metropolitan area would mean accounting for all the other factors that might have generated the decrease. During the baseline methodology meeting held prior to the wave 1 study, participants agreed on a number of causal indicators that IJM would measure over time. Tracking these indicators over time is a vital supplement to the measures reported in this study and will enable both CJA and IJM to make much more confident inferences about the impacts of Project Lantern. Second, the study must be able to measure the dosage and fidelity of the intervention. Dosage refers to the intensity or quantity of the intervention. In Project Lantern, measures of dosage might include the number of minors rescued, the number of traffickers arrested and convicted, or the number of raids carried out (disaggregated by area, establishment, and other factors). Fidelity is the extent to which the actual intervention that was implemented resembles the planned intervention. Third, there must be a plausible and supportable (with evidence) explanation for how the intervention produced the effect. For instance, maybe IJM's investigative activities increased fear of sanctions among people in the sex trade, thus driving them to leave that market permanently or temporarily; maybe fear of sanctions led them to change the market, driving it underground or online; maybe key traffickers were arrested, thus reducing the supply of available minors. A solid evaluation of the effectiveness of Project Lantern will couple the measurements provided by CJA with these other ingredients. This approach will enable IJM and its funders to draw valid and reliable conclusions about the impact of their initiatives in Cebu.

IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Here we share some final observations on sex trafficking in Cebu, as well as some ideas about the methodology and logistics for carrying out studies like this one in the future.

Prior to the wave 1 study, CJA knew very little about the commercial sex industry and the characteristics of sex trafficking in Cebu. We attended some training and information sessions with experienced IJM investigators. We read websites devoted to sex tourism. We read previous field reports filed by IJM investigators who had conducted an initial reconnaissance of sex tourism in Cebu. Other than those distant forms of preparation, our investigators had very little experience in studying sex trafficking and no experience in examining it in the field. By waves 2 and 3, our team was more experienced and we had learned a variety of lessons from the previous waves. While finding minors was very simple during wave 1, they were much more difficult to find in waves 2 and 3. It is important to highlight that by waves 2 and 3, our team was much more experienced and knowledgeable about the sex trade (and familiar with the study site) and therefore the bias built into the study was slanted toward finding more, not fewer, minors. Taken in this context, the results of this study are even more striking.

During all three measurement occasions, locating minors took some persistence. Our experience in wave 1 suggested that people linked closely to the sex trade in Cebu had been trained or coached to tell sex tourists that minors are unavailable. Our investigators found intermediaries routinely trying to talk them into being with 18 or 19 year old girls. That tendency increased in waves 2 and 3. Although sex workers and intermediaries did not mention laws or law enforcement explicitly, there appeared to be a common subtext that being with minors was risky. Accounting for the subtle gestures, noises, and facial expressions is difficult in a study like this, but in the field, those nonverbal cues paint a vivid picture.

Our investigators' efforts to build rapport, build trust, and improvise were essential in breaking down the barriers of those who initially seemed reluctant to cooperate with us or tell us the truth. In some cases, where it seemed like the intermediary might have some kind of moral objection, our investigators would adapt by taking the conversation in a more serious direction, such as discussing our wish to find a young wife and give her a good life in the United States. In other cases where it seemed the intermediary had no moral objection, it might mean relying on some kind of (unfortunate) male bonding ritual over the pleasures of being with a young girl. In wave 1, the initial resistance to connecting us with minors almost seemed like token resistance. In waves 2 and 3, the resistance was more genuine, either because the intermediary did not have the knowledge to help us or simply did

not want to help us. The core of this study turned out to be pushing past people's initial resistance to connecting us with minors.

Waves 2 and 3 presented the additional challenge of intermediaries trying to pass off adults (or adult sex workers passing themselves off) as minors in an effort to meet our demand in the face of reduced supply. This phenomenon was not one of the indicators we tracked formally in our database, but the team's collective judgment was that this form of deception was more pronounced in waves 2 and 3 than in wave 1. While on some occasions we might not have been able to detect this form of deception, in many cases we were. During wave 3, the challenge of locating a minor was exacerbated by an increased fear of legal sanctions. This fear does not seem to have resulted in an increased tendency to warn customers about the risk of sanctions, but does seem to have generated other effects. Mamasans in several establishments declined initially to provide us with information on prices for sex, even with adults. The fear of sanctions seems to have contributed to some oddities in the sexual marketplace. Higher-end establishments now seem more reluctant to be open about offering sexual services; they have placed the burden on the girls who work there to negotiate these transactions on their own. Presumably the girls are then responsible for paying a fee back to the bar. But several girls told us they did not know the price and that we needed to talk to the Mamasan. The Mamasan would then tell us in some of the higher-end establishments that they did not provide such services. Once we established trust, typically by behaving in ways contrary to their notions of how investigators would behave (singing, dancing, acting goofy, pretending to be drunk, etc...), either the Mamasans or the girls would then change their tune and provide us with prices. In these environments, there were two primary forms of deception: claiming not to provide sexual services, and claiming that minors were adults.

In lower-class establishments and in interactions with streetwalkers and pimps, the pattern was different. Here life seemed substantially more desperate and women would often go to great lengths to encourage us to hire them. Often this meant providing a sample of their services for free up front by trying to kiss us, touch us in sexually explicit ways, tell us about their sexual expertise, or make explicit gestures (like pantomiming the act of giving oral sex or swaying their hips in a sexually provocative way). In these environments, the deception worked the opposite way. Here, adults tried to pass themselves off as minors or pimps tried to pass their adult girls off as minors. While fear of sanctions was omnipresent, it does not appear to have influenced all parts of the sexual marketplace equally.

The findings of our study confirm much of what we read and learned before we carried out the baseline data collection in wave 1. There was one important difference. In wave 1, we anticipated being able to find preteens rather easily. Once on the ground in Cebu, despite our best efforts, we were

unable to find them. Even when we talked about finding a young girl to take care of, to give a better life, we were unable to find very young girls. Most of the minors we discovered were 16-17 years old. This was also our experience during the wave 2 and 3 study periods. While we were offered a young virgin by a pimp in wave 2, the amount of time it would take for the pimp to deliver her (from several days up to a week) led us to suspect that traffickers might kidnap or otherwise procure a new girl to meet our demand, so we turned down the offer.

We also found substantial differences in the nature of prostitution and commercial sexual exploitation according to the type of establishment and its location. The high-end karaoke bars are clean and well-kept; they charge higher prices for drinks and for bar fines. The girls typically described to us living conditions that satisfied them at some basic level. They lived with and enjoyed the friendship of the other girls, were fed by the Mamasan, attended health screenings by the local government on a regular basis, and by and large appeared healthy. Some of the minors in these locations told us they had submitted false identification paperwork to the bar in order to get the job. While some fit the conventional image of trafficking victims, in the sense of having been taken away from their home involuntarily, many in the high-end establishments appear to have sought out this kind of work due to economic necessity.

The low-end bars and brothels, such as those located in and around Kamagayan, were very different. Many of the girls had brown or rotting teeth, were wearing old and worn clothing, and showed visible signs of poor health and living in poor conditions (dried skin, greasy hair, brown or broken teeth, etc...). These girls more clearly fit the conventional image of trafficking victims. They conveyed to us the desperation of their lives, often in emotionally wrenching ways.

Methodology and Logistics

Our experiences during each wave of this study also provided a number of lessons about how to carry out studies like this in the future. First, we would have benefited from having either one additional investigative team or a little bit more time in the field (probably about two days). We came close to exhausting the population of establishments in Lapu Lapu and Mandaue City, but we needed more time in Cebu City and particularly in Kamagayan. Kamagayan is so small and concentrated that it presents particular challenges that would really require a longer-term study using methods suited to its unique characteristics.

Second, the status of most of our investigators as westerners was mostly an asset because it assuaged fears about whether we were police officers and allowed us to break through people's resistance about the availability of minors for sex. At the same time, we heard several times that white people were

starting to be involved in enforcement actions against bars and brothels. While IJM was not mentioned by name in either waves 1 or 2, it was mentioned during wave 3, supporting our hunch that people are now much more aware (and fearful) of the illegality of minors in the sex industry.³¹ Girls from establishments at different levels told us that the police are sending white people in to do stings on bars and brothels. The level of danger inherent in a study like this one is proportional to the degree of fear of sanctions and the perception that the people carrying out the study are associated with the police. Thus, studies like this need to pay serious attention to these issues to protect the research team. CJA was fortunate in all three waves to have its own security supplemented by IJM's top-notch investigative staff.

It might also have been useful to have one additional team consisting solely of two Filipino investigators. This would be particularly useful in Kamagayan and other distressed areas, as well as in the bars catering primarily to Filipinos. We went to those places anyway, and in some cases we were successful in finding minors, but it would have been useful to have a Filipino team in place with us to help us figure out what we might have missed. We suspect, for instance, that prices for purchasing sexual services in some areas are probably greater for western sex tourists than for Filipinos, thus our assessment of prices reflects what foreigners pay, not what locals pay.

Third, in wave 1, we underestimated the effect that fatigue and jet-lag would have on the team's performance. Our investigators had difficulty recording their field notes at the end of their shifts without falling asleep or experiencing memory problems, and our command center personnel had difficulty remaining awake across the wide range of hours that the investigative teams worked. We took several steps in wave 2 and 3 to deal with this problem, providing a day off for our team midway through the study, adding an additional staff member to the command center, and more generally remaining alert to excessive fatigue. We still experienced some problem in keeping up with our field notes by the end of the study, with a pronounced decrease in the quality of the field notes from the first day to the last. But overall, fatigue exerted much less of a toll in waves 2 and 3 than it did in wave 1. Planning a study like this requires significantly more attention to fatigue than in any other type of study we have ever conducted.

31 In this specific instance, one of our investigators was speaking with a Mamasan at a bar about the illegal nature of bar fines. The investigator feigned worry that he would somehow be held legally responsible for attempting to bar fine females in the establishment. However, the Mamasan indicated that only she and other managers could be held responsible. She then indicated that American police were working in the Philippines and asked our investigator if he was aware of the International Justice Mission. She then went on to explain that IJM was responsible for having her and another Mamasan jailed for accepting bar fine payments.

Fourth, in each wave, we purchased telephones for every team member. In wave 1, we bought inexpensive phones with insufficient memory and few extra features. As a result, we were unable to take photographs or video recordings, maintain voice recordings useful for filling in details in the field notes, or surreptitiously record conversations in the field. In waves 2 and 3, we purchased better telephones with cameras, voice recorders, and extra memory. In waves 2 and 3, the phones served a vital role, enabling us to capture audio and video recordings easily. We made an error in purchasing phones with cameras that did not have a proper flash, thus some of our photographs taken in dark bars were unclear. We cannot emphasize strongly enough the utility of having full-featured cell phones for investigators in a study like this. The voice recorder enables the investigator to take brief breaks and update his notes. At the end of the evening, these accumulated notes make the job of writing field notes and checking data quality much easier. The voice recorder also enables the investigators to record conversations with intermediaries or sex workers in the field. Having a telephone with a camera for still shots and brief video footage is also useful.

Overall, we are confident that in spite of numerous methodological and logistical challenges, the data we collected constitute an accurate picture of prostitution and commercial sexual exploitation in Cebu. Our investigators were surprised at the extent to which their separate attempts to explore prostitution and sex trafficking resulted in a consistent overall understanding of the problem. We applaud IJM for its willingness to expose their interventions to the scrutiny of an independent evaluation and we encourage other reformers interested in reducing human sex trafficking to do the same. The result will be an increased understanding of the problem, and hopefully an enhanced capacity to implement effective solutions.

APPENDIX 1: WAVE 3 PROJECT TEAM

Project Director

Edward R. Maguire is Associate Professor and Chair in the Department of Justice, Law and Society at American University in Washington, DC. He received his Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from the State University of New York at Albany in 1997. He has held previous positions at George Mason University, the University of Nebraska, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the United Nations. His professional interests cover a wide range of criminal justice topics, but most of his work focuses on police organizations, violent crime, and social science measurement. Over the past six years, he led a team of American scholars and police professionals in diagnosing the causes of a violent crime outbreak in Trinidad and Tobago. Ed served as project director and a field investigator for all three waves of this study.

Command Center Staff

David E. Choate works as the Program Operations Manager for the Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety at Arizona State University. He has worked with dozens of local, county, state, and federal law enforcement agencies; numerous not-for-profit social service organizations, city, county and state agencies, community groups and treatment providers throughout Arizona conducting evaluation, research, and strategic planning initiatives. David has worked with CJA staff on other projects but was a new member of the study team for wave 3 of this project.

Ajima Olaghere is a PhD student in Justice, Law & Crime Policy at George Mason University. She is co-developing the Human Rights Justice Health Library for the International Network for Justice Health. She works as a research fellow at The Sentencing Project and previously worked with the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America's Prisons. Her research interests involve correctional rehabilitation, conditions of confinement, and the relationship between family criminality and sentencing recommendations. Ajima served as a research assistant for waves 2 and 3 of this study.

David Turley has been a police officer for over twenty years and currently works as a Detective for the Glendale (AZ) Police Department. He is currently assigned to the Special Investigations Unit - Gang Enforcement/Fugitive Apprehension Squad. Detective Turley's responsibilities with this squad include conducting protective details requiring covert escort and surveillance, protective details on police officers who have been threatened or targeted, and extradition of violent fugitives from other states or countries. As part of this assignment, he has received training in all aspects of undercover work, including narcotics, prostitution, and surveillance. He is a court recognized expert for the City of Glendale Gang Unit and routinely provides gang training to a variety of audiences. Detective

Turley also coordinates the collection of gang intelligence and maintains the gang database for the City of Glendale. While Dave has worked with CJA staff on other projects, he was a new member of the study team for wave 3 of this project.

Field Investigators

Liqun Cao received his doctorate from the University of Cincinnati in 1993. He is a Professor of sociology and criminology at the University of Ontario's Institute of Technology in Canada. He has held previous positions in the U.S. at Eastern Michigan University, Salem State College, and Miami University. His research interests include comparative sociology, criminological theory, gun ownership, confidence in the police, police abuse of power, and public attitudes toward prostitution. He has published his research in numerous criminology and sociology journals and is the author of a book entitled *Major Criminological Theories: Concepts and Measurement* (2004). His research on prostitution will be published later this year. Liqun served as a field investigator for wave 3.

Melchor de Guzman is an expert on Philippine policing and crime studies. He has written several articles about the Philippine National Police and community policing. He received his Ph. D. in Criminal Justice from the University of Cincinnati. Dr. de Guzman has also been a lecturer in the National Police College of the Philippines and a former director of Command College (East Tennessee). Currently, Dr. de Guzman is an assistant professor at the College at Brockport, State University of New York teaching research methods, criminal justice organization, and policing courses. Mel served as a field investigator for all three waves of this study.

Kyung Jhi was born on Sep. 20, 1969, in Busan, Korea. He graduated from the National Police University in 1992. He was a police officer for 13 years (from 1992 - 2004) in Korea. He also obtained a master's degree in Criminal Justice at Michigan State University in 1999. Currently, he is studying in the doctoral program in Criminal Justice at Sam Houston State University. He is married with two children. Kyung served as a field investigator for waves 2 and 3 of this study.

Charles Katz is the Director of the Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety and is an Associate Professor in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Arizona State University. His research involves collaborating with agencies to increase their organizational capacity for responding strategically to crime. He co-authored the award-winning book *Policing Gangs in America* (2004). He also co-authored one of the leading textbooks in police studies, *The Police in America: An Introduction* (2010, 7th edition). Chuck was involved in designing this project and he served as a field investigator for all three waves of this study.

William R. King received his doctorate in criminal justice from the University of Cincinnati in 1998 and is an associate professor of criminal justice at Sam Houston State University in Texas. Dr. King specializes in research on police and forensics organizations and processes with a focus on long-term change and continuity in organizational structure and personnel allocations. Between 2005 and 2008 he was involved in a number of anti-crime initiatives with the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) and the Forensic Science Centre (FSC). These initiatives involved a study of the processing of forensic evidence by the TTPS and FSC, and a study of homicide investigations by the Homicide Bureau of Investigations in the TTPS. Bill served as a field investigator for waves 1 and 3 of this study.

Jeffrey B. Snipes received his Ph.D. in criminal justice from the State University of New York at Albany, and his J.D. from Stanford Law School. In addition to working at the COPS Office, Department of Justice, he has taught at Florida State and Seattle Universities, and currently is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Criminal Justice Studies at San Francisco State University. His research interests include theoretical criminology, civil rights litigation, and police behavior. He has been heavily involved in recent transformation efforts with the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, and also occasionally practices law in California. Jeff was involved in designing this project and he served as a field investigator for all three waves of this study.

William Wells is an associate professor in the College of Criminal Justice at Sam Houston State University. His research interests have led him to examine the relationship between guns, crime, and criminal justice responses aimed at reducing gun-related problems. In addition, he has studied a variety of reforms in policing, including community policing, policing hotspots of crime, and police responses to the mentally ill. Since 2007 he has been working with a team of researchers who provide technical assistance to the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service on several crime reduction initiatives. Bill served as a field investigator for all three waves of this study.

APPENDIX 2: SUMMARY OF DATA ON ESTABLISHMENTS

Variable	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Total number of visits	115	102	129
Bars	84	88	114
Brothels	12	4	7
Massage parlors	19	10	8
Total establishments visited	94	82	81
Bars	66	69	68
Brothels	11	3	5
Massage parlors	16	10	8
Number of establishments with confirmed minors	35	15	10
Total confirmed minors (in establishments only)	88	20	18
Average number of confirmed minors at establishments with minors	2.5	1.7	1.8
Average # sex workers			
Bars	22.6	25.5	19.0
Brothels	17.8	N/A ³²	19.4
Massage parlors	5.3	18.3	3.1
Average # suspected to be minor			
Bars	2.0	1.24	0.73
Brothels	2.2	1.5	0
Massage parlors	0.11	0.38	0
Average # confirmed minors			
Bars	0.98	0.34	0.28
Brothels	0.50	1.5	0
Massage parlors	0	0	0

³² Data on total sex workers were only available for one of the brothels, therefore the “average” is not meaningful.

Variable	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Security Measures			
Doormen per establishment	1.17	0.93	1.01
# visits with no doormen	41.7%	28.7%	33.3%
# visits with one doorman	30.4%	53.2%	54.0%
# visits with two or more doormen	27.8%	18.2%	12.5%
# visits with armed doormen	34.8%	45.1%	26.7%
# visits where field workers were frisked	2.6%	2.2%	1.2%
# visits where field workers were searched electronically	0%	1.1%	1.2%

APPENDIX 3: SUMMARY OF DATA ON ATTEMPTS

Description of Variable	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Number of global attempts to find minor sex workers	66	28	20
Number terminated administratively	13	4	5
Number ending in locating a confirmed minor	53	24	15
Total time spent during successful attempts	116.5 hours	125.9 hours	112.3 hours
Average minutes per attempt (time to locate a minor)	113	314.7	449.3
Minimum minutes per attempt	13	31	81
Maximum minutes per attempt	342	1,069	1,390
Number of sub-attempts to find minor sex workers	159	116	134
Average number of sub-attempts per successful global attempt	2.57	4.04	8.9
Minors promised during sub-attempts	56	22	14
Minors confirmed in establishments	88	20	18
Minors confirmed outside of establishments	15	9	3
Total confirmed minors	103	29	21
Total sex workers found in establishments	1,493	1,282	1,082
Total sex workers found outside of establishments	57	53	287
Total sex workers found	1,550	1,335	1,369
Average price, including bar fine (if any) and price for sex worker	P 3010	P 2603	P 2492
Range of prices for minor sex workers	P 500–P 6000	P 700–P 5500	P 700 - 5000
Percentage of sub-attempts in which either a sex worker or an intermediary mentioned either law enforcement or laws against sex with minors	17.6%	19.8%	19.2%

ABOUT CJA

CJA is a consulting firm based in Northern Virginia near Washington, DC. The firm provides training, technical assistance, research, evaluation, and other services related to crime prevention and criminal justice. CJA's services are provided by a network of scholars and professionals with backgrounds primarily in social science, policing, law, and forensics. CJA specializes in using cutting-edge analysis and collaborative strategies to improve the capacity of organizations and governments for reducing crime and enhancing justice.



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